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I. Introduction
On May 11, 2012, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
proposed what would be the first new regulations of hydraulic fracturing on
federal lands in several decades. 1 The proposed rules would affect, in
addition to about 700 million acres of mineral estate across the country
managed by BLM, 56 million acres of Indian mineral estate subject to
federal oversight. 2 The proposal received a widely varied response from
tribal governments, including strident criticism from both tribes that were
enthusiastic about the economic benefits of energy development on tribal
land3 and those that were opposed to any and all fracturing on tribal lands.4
*
Class of 2014, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1.
See Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and Indian
Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27691, 27691–92 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R.
pt. 3160) (“[C]urrent BLM regulations governing hydraulic fracturing operations on public
lands are more than 30 years old and were not written to address modern hydraulic
fracturing activities.”).
2.
See id. (stating the scope of BLM’s regulatory authority).
3.
See, e.g., Bureau of Land Management’s Hydraulic Fracturing Rule’s Impacts on
Indian Tribal Energy Development: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Indian and Alaska
Native Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of the Hon. Tex G. Hall, Chairman, Mandan,
Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation of the Fort Berthold Reservation) [hereinafter Hall testimony]
(criticizing the BLM for its failure to consult meaningfully with affected tribes, and
criticizing the regulations themselves for creating additional obstacles in an already
overburdened permitting process for resource development on tribal lands).
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The extent of comment on the proposal was so great, from both tribal
constituencies and the general public, that BLM withdrew its proposal in
order to rewrite the rules,5 releasing a revised version on May 16, 2013.6
The proposal and tribal responses illustrated the complexity of
interests and issues raised by the prospect of hydraulic fracturing and
expanded energy extraction on Indian lands: tribal economic development,
pollution, environmental protection, tribal sovereignty, and national energy
policy all enter into consideration,7 rendering more complicated an issue
that is already contentious outside Indian country. The stakes for energyproducing tribes are substantial, with tribes receiving over $414 million in
revenue from oil and gas production royalties in the 2011 fiscal year8 alone.
Moreover, in the area of the Bakken Formation—the focus of this
note—six reservations with a total of over forty-five thousand residents
stand to be directly affected by hydraulic fracturing and energy production
on or near reservation lands.9 Aside from the revenue directly generated for
tribes by production royalties, the rise of substantial oil and gas production
on reservation lands has been markedly beneficial for tribal economies,
leading to the creation of not only jobs directly involved in extraction and
production, but also Indian-owned businesses that service the mining
4.
See Bureau of Land Management’s Hydraulic Fracturing Rule’s Impacts on
Indian Tribal Energy Development: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Indian and Alaska
Native Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Larry DeCouteau, Dist. Four Tribal
Council Representative, Turtle Mntn. Band of Chippewa Indians) [hereinafter DeCouteau
testimony] (criticizing the intrusion of a federal bureaucracy into a regulatory matter within
the scope of tribal sovereignty).
5.
See Darren Goode, Interior Retooling Its Fracking Rule, POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2013,
7:22
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/interior-retooling-its-fracking-rule86424.html (reporting the announced withdrawal and revision of the proposed rule, and
projecting a release of the revised rules by March 31, 2013) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
6.
See Press Release, Bureau of Land Management, Interior Releases Updated Draft
Rule for Hydraulic Fracturing on Public and Indian Lands for Public Comment, (May 16,
2013),
available
at
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/newsroom/2013/may/
nr_05_16_2013.html. See also Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Indian Lands, at 1
[hereinafter revised rules], available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/
Communications_Directorate/public_affairs/hydraulicfracturing.Par.91723.File.tmp/HydFra
c_SupProposal.pdf (summarizing the basic changes to the revised rule).
7.
See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
8.
See Office of Natural Resources Revenue, Reported Revenues, American Indian
for FY 2011 by Accounting Year, available at http://statistics.onrr.gov/ReportTool.aspx (last
visited Jan. 11, 2013). BLM estimates that hydraulic fracturing is used in 90 percent of
existing wells on federal land to stimulate well production. Supra note 1, at 27693.
9.
U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Profile of General Population and
Housing
Characteristics:
2010
Demographic
Profile
Data,
available
at
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_
DP_DPDP1 (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (compiling data reflecting the reservation
populations as of the 2010 census in the Williston Basin).
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operations.10 In some areas, energy extraction both comprises a substantial
segment of the current reservation economy11 and represents an important
sector for future economic growth. 12 But at the same time, such mining
operations pose serious environmental risks, most notably groundwater
contamination from the fracturing operation and subsequent wastewater
disposal, as well as air pollution from surface operations at the mining
site.13 Such hazards led to the high-profile decision by the Turtle Mountain
Band of Chippewa Indians to ban outright hydraulic fracturing, although
not all oil production, until such time as mining companies could prove the
practice would not endanger limited aquifers available on the reservation.14
Concerns about groundwater safety also led the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to commission a nationwide study of the effects of hydraulic
fracturing on drinking water supplies, although the results of that study are
not expected until 2014.15
10.
See Comment Letter from Council of Energy Resource Tribes to Bureau of Land
Management, at 14–15 (Sept. 10, 2012) [hereinafter CERT comment], available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2012-0001-7204 (last visited Jan.
14, 2013) (compiling tribal reports showing dozens of businesses and hundreds of jobs on
the reservations across the region tied to energy production, and arguing that these are
jeopardized by the cost of the proposed regulations).
11.
See id. at 14 (stating that of the 121 Indian-owned businesses registered with the
Fort Berthold Reservation’s Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance office, 101 serve oil and
gas producers).
12.
See Hall testimony, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that the MHA Nation projects that
300 new wells will be drilled on the reservation in 2013, or 120% of all wells in operation on
the reservation as of April 2012).
13.
See Dennis C. Stickley, Expanding Best Practice: The Conundrum of Hydraulic
Fracturing, 12 WYO. L. REV. 321, 324–25 (2012) (summarizing the scientific community’s
concerns with the practice, including groundwater contamination, wastewater disposal,
release of methane concentrations, and destabilization of geologic faults); Lisa M. McKenzie
et al., Human Health Risk Assessment of Air Emissions from Development of
Unconventional Natural Gas Resources, 424 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 79, 79–87 (2012) (projecting
that residents in the vicinity of natural gas extraction operations were subject to a slightly
elevated cancer risk, but an appreciable risk of non-cancer health effects, due to toxic
chemicals released into the air by fracturing and extraction).
14.
See Turtle Mountain Tribal Council Res. TMBC627-11-11 (Nov. 29, 2011),
available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/62-2011/docs/pdf/ts032612appendixd.pdf
(prohibiting any fracking on land that could affect the Shell Valley aquifer, and directing the
cancellation of lease bids for which the fracking ban was not yet in effect); James C. Falcon,
Tribe Bans Fracking on Reservation, MINOT DAILY NEWS, (Nov. 23, 2011),
https://www.minotdailynews.com/page/content.detail/id/560660/Tribe-bans-fracking-onreservation.html?nav=5010 (describing passage of the tribal council resolution banning the
practice and the council’s concern with polluting the Shell Valley aquifer, the reservation’s
primary water source); DeCouteau testimony, supra note 4, at 1–2 (“Fracking, as it’s
currently being done in the western part of the state of North Dakota is not a process that
interests us at Turtle Mountain.”).
15.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/601/R-12/011, STUDY OF THE
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES:
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This note examines the particular issues presented by hydraulic
fracturing and hydrocarbon extraction on Indian lands, focusing on
reservations overlapping the Williston Basin in the upper Midwest, an area
in which extraction has accelerated significantly. Section Two will describe
hydraulic fracturing in a broader context, including the historical use of the
practice, a description of the technique, and its importance in relation to
national energy policy. This section will also introduce the specific
environmental concerns raised by hydraulic fracturing –in particular, toxic
chemicals that are involved and the ways that the procedure, as deployed in
the Williston Basin, may result in their release. Section Three will discuss
state regulatory frameworks and requirements placed on energy producers,
which govern operations outside Indian reservations on land under the
states’ jurisdiction. Section Four will discuss the Indian lands in the region,
the details of the proposed BLM regulations on fracturing, and the current
state of tribal jurisdiction over, and regulation of, hydraulic fracturing
within the outer bounds of Indian reservations. Section Five will consider
the existing tribal regulations, the availability of meaningful private causes
of action, and the resulting importance of creating appropriate regulatory
frameworks. Section Six will conclude by considering multiple potential
solutions aimed at improving tribal control of resource extraction and
environmental protection.
II. Hydraulic Fracturing: Technique, Geology, and Unintended
Consequences
The basic principle of using hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” to
stimulate oil and natural gas wells has been employed for several decades,
first appearing in 1947 and developing in the years thereafter.16 In order to
access resource-bearing rock strata, a well is excavated to the target depth;
drilling then continues horizontally along the stratum, allowing one
wellbore to access a larger segment of the deposit than would be possible
with a straight well.17 The recent increase in energy production in which
fracking plays a role has been enabled by the development of “slickwater”
PROGRESS REPORT 247 (2012) (noting that EPA plans to release the results of its study,
subject to peer review by its Science Advisory Board, in “late 2014”).
16.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO
UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED
METHANE RESERVOIRS App. A-1 (2004) (“The first hydraulic fracturing treatment was
pumped in 1947 on a gas well operated by Pan American Petroleum Corporation . . . [and
has since] become a standard treatment for stimulating the productivity of oil and gas
wells.”).
17.
See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 46–48 (2009) [hereinafter DOE Primer]
(describing the process of well drilling and preparation for production).
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hydraulic fracturing techniques during the last decade. 18 In slickwater
hydraulic fracturing, the horizontal wellbores are used to inject acid into
hydrocarbon-bearing shale formations, cleaning and preparing the rock for
the injection of hydraulic fracturing fluid—composed primarily of water,
“proppant,” and various other chemicals. 19 The pressure of the injection
fractures the surrounding rock, while the proppant—typically a sand-like
medium—holds the fractures open to permit extraction of the oil or gas in
the shale formation.20
This well stimulation process is necessary because the shale
formations are not otherwise permeable enough to permit the extraction of
oil and gas in quantities that make drilling economically feasible.21 Hence,
the shale formations are considered one of several types of
“unconventional” reservoir, which are distinguished from the more porous
“conventional” reservoirs in which oil and gas can be extracted from the
existing formation.22 Once the shale has been fractured, oil and gas can
migrate through the fracking fluid and proppant to the surface for
extraction.23 When the fracturing operation is completed, a portion of the
fracturing fluid flows back toward the surface; this flowback fluid, along
with the remaining fracturing fluid, must be disposed of once production at
the well is completed. 24 This may be accomplished by underground
injection—essentially, returning the fluid to the well and attempting to seal
it underground—or by treatment of the fluids, followed by either reuse or
discharge into surface waterways.25
To the extent that fracturing operations pose a risk to groundwater,
that risk arises either from failures in the well casing as it passes through

18.
See Stickley, supra note 13, at 324 (stating that slickwater hydraulic fracturing
permitted stimulated production in shale formations); Hannah Wiseman, Beyond Coastal Oil
v. Garza: Nuisance and Trespass in Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation, 57 THE ADVOC. (TEX.)
8, 8 (2012) (“Slickwater fracturing . . . has allowed an astoundingly large number of new
wells to be developed; in some cases, oil and gas companies are drilling and fracturing wells
in areas that have not recently experienced heavy oil or gas production.”).
19.
See Wiseman, supra note 18, at 8 (describing slickwater hydrofracking).
20.
See Stickley, supra note 13, at 323–24 (describing slickwater hydrofracking).
21.
See DOE Primer, supra note 16, at 14 (discussing shale’s low permeability and the
limited speed with which it can travel through unfractured rock formations); Well
Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and Indian Lands, supra note 1, at
27692–93 (discussing the commercial need for fracturing in these formations).
22.
See DOE Primer, supra note 17, at 15 (describing conventional and
unconventional reservoirs).
23.
See Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and Indian
Lands, supra note 1, at 27692–93 (describing the extraction process).
24.
See DOE Primer, supra note 17, at 66–68 (summarizing water management
considerations and techniques).
25.
See DOE Primer, supra note 17, at 66–68.
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aquifers—a hazard not unique to hydraulic fracturing26—or from the release
of wastewater used in fracturing operations. 27 When a well is to be
constructed, the hole is drilled first, followed by the installation of steel
pipe secured by cement casing, intended to isolate the wellbore from the
surrounding groundwater and withstand the stresses of injection and
extraction during operation.28 Multiple kinds of logging tools can thereafter
be employed to judge the status of the well and test for well integrity
issues. 29 Estimates of the likelihood of a well incurring a mechanical
integrity failure have varied considerably, ranging from one in fifty million
to one in ten.30 Purely empirical reviews have shown that two percent of
leaks into groundwater supplies are actually due to failures in the
mechanical integrity of a well.31 Rozell and Reaven estimate that the effects
of such a failure would be relatively minimal, peaking at a worst-case
release of about 60 cubic meters of water from a breached well. 32 By
comparison, the average fracturing operation uses roughly 11,300 cubic
meters of water per well.33
Far more serious are the risks associated with retention and disposal
of the large quantities of wastewater—which include the additives and
proppants used in fracturing—once they are pumped out of the well, usually
into surface impoundments or tanks on site. 34 Although fracturing water
may sometimes be recycled, it is often necessary to store wastewater (which
fracturing produces in greater quantities than conventional production) on
26.
See Jeffrey C. King et al., Factual Causation: The Missing Link in Hydraulic
Fracture—Groundwater Contamination Litigation, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 341, 351
(“If there is potential for groundwater contamination resulting from oil and gas production, a
more likely source (other than a surface spill) is improper surface well casing. This is true
whether or not a well is fracture stimulated.”).
27.
See Stickley, supra note 13, at 334–35 (“In the case of [fracking] fluids, the
selection of the method of disposal raises concern about the contamination of soil and water
due to the chemical constituents in the fluid, particularly where the produced water contains
petrochemicals or BTEX [benzene, toluene, ethylebenzene, and xylene].”).
28.
See American Petroleum Institute, Guidance Document HF-1, at 2–4 (describing
the process of well construction and engineering aims).
29.
See id. at 8–10 (describing methods for testing the success of cement casing
installation).
30.
See Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, Water Pollution Risk Associated with
Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 Risk Analysis 1382, 1386–87 (citing
an API finding that the lifetime risk of contamination from an oil & gas well is 1 in 50
million well-years, and a contrary study finding that 1 in 10 oil & gas wells failed a
mechanical integrity test).
31.
See id. at 1387 (citing a 1987 survey of wastewater injection wells by the
Underground Injection Practices Council).
32.
See id. at 1389 (modeling the contamination produced by well casing failure).
33.
See DOE Primer, supra note 17, at 64 (stating that the average shale gas well using
hydraulic fracturing requires three million gallons of water).
34.
See American Petroleum Institute, Guidance Document HF2, at 17–19 (discussing
best practices for fluid handling and storage).
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site in preparation for treatment and/or transport for disposal.35 Industry’s
best practices call for storage solutions designed to limit the extent to which
wastewater might escape containment and discharge into surface water,
including liners for open pits to prevent seepage into the ground or
established standards for tanks. 36 Despite these precautions, Rozell and
Reaven’s modeling indicates that even in the best-case scenario, it is “very
likely that an individual well would generate at least 200 m3 of
contaminated fluids,” largely due to wastewater disposal issues; and at
worst, a serious failure of a retention pond would result in the release of
thousands of cubic meters of wastewater.37
The ultimate fate of this wastewater matters for water quality in the
vicinity of production sites. Wastewater may include additives used for
certain purposes in the fracturing process, such as acids, corrosion
inhibitors, and biocides, as well as bacteria, minerals, hydrocarbons, and
naturally-occurring radioactive material drawn from the shale strata
themselves.38 The flowback water may also be highly saline, depending on
multiple factors including the properties of formation water in the target
strata. 39 Not uncommonly, fracking fluid also contains low levels of
benzene, ethylene glycol, and naphthalene.40 Ingestion of these chemicals
can have significant negative health effects, and—for benzene and
naphthalene—chronic exposure has shown some evidence of carcinogenic
effect.41
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 18–19 (describing the recommended standards, which are often reflected in
state-law regulatory requirements).
37.
Rozell & Reaven, supra note 30, at 1389–90.
38.
See DOE Primer, supra note 17, at 64 (listing common fracturing additives); API,
Guidance Document HF2, at 17 (describing the contribution of hydrocarbons, organic
compounds, and NORMs to flowback water from formation water).
39.
See API, Guidance Document HF2, at 17 (describing the salinity characteristics of
wastewater).
40.
See API, Guidance Document HF2, at 7 (including these chemicals in a list of
fracking fluid additives, while noting that they are “seldom used and/or used in very small
quantities”).
41.
See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Naphthalene, Hazardous Substances Data Bank,
http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-bin/sis/search/f?./temp/~hGLY9u:1 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013)
(detailing the cancer risk through oral and ingestion exposure, and blood disorders arising
from general exposure) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate,
and the Environment); U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Ethylene Glycol, Hazardous Substances
Data Bank, http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-bin/sis/search/f?./temp/~8oITcL:1 (last visited Apr.
8, 2013) (noting the appearance of neurobehavioral and neurological disorders at significant
doses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment); U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Benzene, Hazardous Substances Data Bank,
http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-bin/sis/search/f?./temp/~37YPRW:1 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013)
(detailing toxic neurological and gastrointestinal effects, as well as established status as a
human carcinogen responsible for multiple types of leukemia) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
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Although the concerns discussed to this point have dealt with
accidental releases of wastewater, and although industry best practices
prescribe treatment and disposal methods that account for environmental
considerations, 42 accidental releases are not the only source of concern.
Underground injection for permanent storage is currently the “principal
method” of managing wastewater from oil and gas production,43 with the
prospect that local water quality could degrade as a result.44 Likewise, the
detrimental effects of wastewater discharge can, in principle, be prevented
with appropriate terms in drilling permits or local water quality standards.45
But those limitations cannot be considered foolproof, no less because of the
practical difficulties of enforcement 46 than because of the potential for
inadequate permitting standards in the first instance.47
The substantial water requirements of hydraulic fracturing also
raises concerns about the availability of this resource, given that use of
ordinary surface water sources “can possibly impact other competing uses
and will be of concern to local water management authorities,” who will
seek to avoid interference with existing community uses.48 In addition to
the direct effects of development and oil and gas production, withdrawal
and reintroduction of water can substantially reduce the surface water
available to other local consumers, while also reducing its quality

42.
See API, Guidance Document HF2, at 20–23 (describing recommended
approaches to treatment and disposal, including underground injection and treatment for
industrial reuse).
43.
GROUND WATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, STATE OIL AND GAS REGULATIONS
DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 30 (2009).
44.
See Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water
Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PNAS 8172, 8174–75
(stating that fracturing water that remains underground could displace formation water into
shallow aquifers, increasing the presence of dissolved solids and trace toxins). Cf. Tom
Myers, Potential Contaminant Pathways from Hydraulically Fractured Shale to Aquifers, 50
GROUNDWATER 872, 879–80 (discussing hydrological models and the potential for
contaminant flow from shale strata toward the surface over a period of years).
45.
See API, Guidance Document HF2, at 20–22 (noting that most well permits
require eventual removal of all fracture fluids and flowback water, and that municipal or
industrial water treatment facilities may face limitations on their handling of flowback
water).
46.
See James R. Cox, Revisiting RCRA’s Oilfield Waste Exemption as to Certain
Hazardous Oilfield Exploration and Production Wastes, 14 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 25–26
(2002) (describing the prevalence of improper oilfield waste disposal and the “shortage of
money and manpower” devoted to police compliance).
47.
See Elizabeth Shogren, Loophole Lets Toxic Oil Flow Over Indian Land, National
Public Radio, Nov. 15, 2012 (describing how EPA permits oil producers operating on
Wyoming’s Wind River Reservation to discharge untreated wastewater containing fracking
additives if the water is needed by ranchers or wildlife).
48.
See API, Guidance Document HF2, at 14.
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(specifically, changes to sedimentation, temperature, and oxygen content).49
In parts of the arid west, where oil shale extraction is increasing, production
could quickly outpace the availability of water, leading either to the
constraint of the industry’s growth in that area or the acquisition of
additional water rights from other stakeholders in the region.50
Because the positive economic consequences of increased oil and
gas development are so important in Indian Country,51 the social drawbacks
for communities in the vicinity of new production sources also bears
mention. The oil boomtowns of North Dakota have experienced significant
strain on infrastructure—most notably, housing, water and sewage, and
roads—as a result of the influx of people and activity associated with
quickly expanded extraction activity. 52 Law enforcement and the local
courts have been “swamped” by the sudden changes. 53 Elsewhere, while
new production has bolstered local economies, it is also the case that most
of the wealth associated with resource extraction has ultimately flowed out
of the community, which is left with the costs of maintaining additional
infrastructure and coping with any environmental problems that arise. 54
This goes to show that expectations of the very real economic gains to be
made from capitalizing on new energy production must be tempered by the
realities of administering those activities, and simply living with their
consequences.
III. Good Fences: Neighbor States and their Regulations
The Bakken Formation is a large shale formation that overlaps a
large portion of the Williston Basin, covering roughly the northeastern
quarter of the state of Montana and the western two-thirds of the state of

49.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-35, ENERGY-WATER NEXUS: A
BETTER AND COORDINATED UNDERSTANDING OF WATER RESOURCES COULD HELP MITIGATE
THE IMPACTS OF POTENTIAL OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT 10–12 (2010) (reciting these adverse
impacts gleaned from expert consultations).
50.
Id. at 25–26 (noting this problem for oil shale developers in Colorado and Utah).
51.
See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text (describing royalties and economic
benefits).
52.
See John McChesney, Oil Boom Puts Strain on North Dakota Towns, National
Public Radio (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/02/142695152/oil-boom-putsstrain-on-north-dakota-towns (describing the social costs and strain on infrastructure
resulting from the influx of oilrig workers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
53.
Joshua P. Fershee, The Oil and Gas Evolution: Learning From the Hydraulic
Fracturing Experiences in North Dakota and West Virginia, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 23,
26 (2012).
54.
See id. at 28–30 (describing West Virginia’s experience with hydraulic fracturing
to extract natural gas from the Marcellus Shale).
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North Dakota.55 This is an area of mostly flat land and rolling hills, shaped
by the few large river systems that cover the area.56 Because it receives
little rain, leaving it a semiarid zone, energy developments are a large and
growing consumer of the limited water resources in the region. 57 The
Williston Basin has also historically had problems with brine contamination
resulting from unlined mining wastewater pits leaking into groundwater,
and the U.S. Geological Survey has indicated concern that further leakage
from retention ponds, accidental spills, and surface water discharges could
negatively affect wetlands, water quality, and livestock drinking water.58
Fracking in an area like the Williston Basin differs from fracking
operations elsewhere, such as those in Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale,
despite the fact that both involve the hydraulic fracturing and extraction of
resources from shale strata.59 The particular geology of the region means
that most aquifers used are confined to rock strata in the upper 2,000 feet,
leaving a significant barrier between water-bearing layers and those strata
of the Bakken Formation that would be targeted for resource extraction.60
Whereas there is serious debate over whether fractures produced by well
stimulation operations in areas like the Marcellus Shale can actually have a
direct effect on groundwater supplies,61 the fact that the Bakken Formation
55.
See U.S. Geological Survey, Williston and Powder River Basins Groundwater
Availability Study, http://mt.water.usgs.gov/projects/WaPR/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013)
(showing Bakken Formation, Williston Basin, and production wells) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
56.
See id. at “Background—Physiography” (describing the topography of the
Williston Basin).
57.
See id. at “Need for Study” and “Background—Physiography” (describing the
water resources available in the area and the role of oil and gas production as a water
consumer).
58.
See U.S. Geological Survey, Examination of Brine Contamination Risk to Aquatic
Resources from Petroleum Development in the Williston Basin 1–2 (2011), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2011/3047/pdf/FS2011-3047.pdf (describing past and present
problems with salinity and water quality due to oil and gas production).
59.
See DOE Primer, supra note 17, at 17 (stating that the Marcellus shale in
Pennsylvania begins at a depth of 4,000 feet, or 3,150 feet below the base of the layer of
treatable water); Osborn et al., supra note 44, at 8173 (finding a strong relationship between
significantly elevated groundwater methane levels and active extraction sites, as opposed to
inactive extraction sites, in Pennsylvania); Julie A. LeFever, Montana—North Dakota?
Middle Member Bakken Play, at 21 (2005) (showing that the upper member of the Bakken
formation begins at a depth of about 10,580 feet) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
60.
See U.S. Geological Survey, Williston and Powder River Basins Groundwater
Availability Study, supra note 55, at “Background—Hydrogeology” (discussing the
locations of water-bearing strata in the region); LeFever, supra note 59, at 21 (showing the
start of the Bakken formation several thousand feet lower).
61.
Compare King et al., supra note 26, at 350 (“[I]t is physically impossible for
hydraulic fracturing to create vertical pathways from oil and gas bearing shale formations
into aquifers. There is simply too much vertical separation between the two geological
structures.”) and Tarek Saba & Mark Orzechowski, Letter, Lack of Data to Support a
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is roughly twice as deep appears to make this a far less likely possibility.62
States are not the only sovereigns with lawmaking and regulatory
power in the region: a number of Indian tribes have substantial reservations
throughout both Montana and North Dakota.63 Notwithstanding the extent
to which tribes have the inherent authority to control activity within the
boundaries of their reservations to the exclusion of states (a point that will
be discussed later), state law and regulation obtain outside those
boundaries. 64 The presence of a number of wells in relatively close
proximity to reservation boundaries makes it important to consider what
oversight protections are afforded by states in which tribes are located.65
North Dakota state agencies have made regulations of general
applicability for oil and gas extraction operations that provide legal limits
for fracking. 66 Applications must be filed, including a description of the
Relationship Between Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Wells and Hydraulic
Fracturing, 108 PNAS E633, E633 (criticizing Osborn et al. and the conclusions of their
research) with Myers, supra note 44, at 874–75, 880 (arguing that hydraulic fractures could
“contact higher conductivity sandstone, natural fractures, or unplugged abandoned wales
above the target shale,” permitting upward movement of brine and other fluid over a span of
decades) and Scott Detrow, Across Pa., Abandoned Wells Litter the Land, Morning Edition,
National Public Radio (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/11/13/164139865/acrosspa-abandoned-wells-litter-the-land (describing instances of current fracturing causing
methane gas leaks and explosions from interaction with abandoned and unregistered wells)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
62.
See Richard J. Davies et al., Hydraulic Fractures: How Far Can They Go?, 37
MARINE & PETROLEUM GEOLOGY 1, 5 (“The maximum upward propagation recorded for a
stimulated hydraulic fracture to date is ~588 m [1,929 feet] in the Barnett shale in the
USA.”).
63.
See BIA Regional, Agency and Field Offices Map, available at
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc013422.pdf (last visited Mar. 22,
2013) (showing Indian reservations and BIA offices nationwide).
64.
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01[1][b], at 211 (Nell
Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN] (“Tribes have plenary and exclusive power
over their members and their territory subject only to limitations imposed by federal law.”);
id. § 6.01[5], at 503 (noting that although state jurisdiction may be precluded within Indian
country, nondiscriminatory state laws apply to events outside Indian country “unless federal
law provides otherwise”).
65.
FracFocus, a collaborative registry of drilling sites using hydraulic fracturing,
indicates that in the Williston Basin area, there are at least five wells operating within about
two miles of the border of the Fort Peck reservation in Montana, and around 40 within two
miles of the Fort Berthold reservation in North Dakota. See Ground Water Protection
Council, Find a Well, FRACFOCUS, http://www.fracfocusdata.org/fracfocusfind/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2013) (displaying well locations of participating operators) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Outside the
Williston Basin, there are other reservations in similar proximity to wells, such as the Uintah
and Ouray in Utah, and the Navajo and Ute in the Four Corners area. See id. (same).
66.
See Christopher Kulander, The States’ Legal Framework: Texas/Louisiana Region
American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation:
Hydraulic Fracturing Core Issues & Trends, at 30 (“[A]lthough North Dakota's regulations
do not directly address hydraulic fracturing, certain regulations . . . may effect hydraulic
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well’s specifications and the operator’s plan for constructing the well
casing, and a permit granted based on that application, before a production
well can be drilled. 67 Moreover, an additional application and permit is
required in order to conduct well recompletion activities and to drill
horizontal wells, and the regulators are entitled to impose on such permits
“such terms and conditions on the permits issued under this section as the
director deems necessary.” 68 Regulators are also permitted to deny the
operator a permit if the well, as proposed, “would cause, or tend to cause,
waste . . . .”69 The rules also provide specific minimum standards for well
casing, tubing and cementing, along with the general requirement that all
wells—including injection wells—“shall be properly cemented at sufficient
depths to adequately protect and isolate all formations containing water, oil,
gas or any combination of these” and shall be drilled using only methods
“which will protect all freshwater-bearing strata.”70 Defective casings must
be reported to regulators, who have the option to require testing to ensure
well integrity, or otherwise to plug the well.71
On April 1, 2012, a number of new or amended regulations went
into effect with specific relevance for hydraulic fracturing operations.72 The
regulations impose specific limitations on fracturing operations, including
requirements for control and diversion of flowback fluids, limitations on
treating pressure for some fracking operations to eighty-five percent of
API’s maximum rating for a particular well casing, requirements for casing
and cement evaluation and inspection, and required pressure testing for
intermediate casings and wellheads.73 Under the rules, operators are also
required to make full disclosure to FracFocus all elements of the operation
tracked by the registry, and to do so within sixty days of the time the
fracturing.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment). See generally N.D. ADMIN. CODE art. 43-02 (governing well construction
standards, waste handling, and underground injection); id. ch. 32 (governing oil and gas
production generally, permitting, exploration requirements, compensation for damages, and
carbon storage).
67.
See Kulander, supra note 66, at 30–31 (describing the permit application
requirement); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-16 (outlining the requirements).
68.
N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-16. See Kulander, supra note 66, at 30–31
(discussing the code standards). This requirement appears to have substantial import for
regulation of hydraulic fracturing wells, which typically require horizontal drilling in order
to be effective in shale formations. See DOE Primer, supra note 17, at 46–47 (discussing
how horizontal drilling is increasingly necessary in more mature shale plays, and is typically
a more economical production method than vertical wells).
69.
N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-16. See Kulander, supra note 66, at 31 (discussing
the code standards).
70.
N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-21.
71.
Id. § 43-02-03-22.
72.
Id. § 43-02-03-27.1 et seq.
73.
See id. § 43-02-03-27.1 (enumerating the requirements specifically for hydraulic
fracture stimulation).
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stimulation is performed. 74 Likewise, operators are required to notify
regulators within twenty-four hours if pressure in the casing exceeds a
certain threshold.75 The 2012 regulations include a new provision expressly
prohibiting operators from allowing “any spill or leak . . . to flow over,
pool, or rest on the surface of the land or infiltrate the soil,” even within
containment dikes around the well. 76 This rule complements an older
provision requiring notification, within twenty-four hours, and subsequent
written reporting in case of any fire, leak, spill, or blowout of more than one
barrel.77
General regulations also control certain aspects of drilling
byproducts, site containment, and waste disposal. Regulators may impose
various requirements on the construction of the well site in order to avoid
interference with water supplies or the surrounding landscape, including
grading of the site, construction of dikes around the well, fencing,
distancing from bodies of water or natural drainages, and reclamation of
sites within six months of well completion.78 Fencing is required for open
pits and ponds containing saltwater or oil, while screening and netting must
also be constructed for oil pits.79 Perhaps most important, the regulations
impose strict limitations on operators’ ability to use open pits to store
“saltwater, drilling mud, crude oil, waste oil, or other waste,” permitting
such storage only in cases of emergency with express approval of
regulators.80 Temporary use of such pits for storage is permitted “to retain
oil, water, cement, solids, or fluids generated in well completion” for no
more than seventy-two hours after the completion of the related operations,
with the contents thereafter to be removed from the site.81 Once removed,
the contents must be “properly disposed of in an authorized facility” and/or
“removed from the pit and disposed of in an authorized disposal well or
used in a manner approved by the director.” 82 Any such pits must be
sufficiently impermeable to “provide adequate temporary containment” of
74.
See id. (“Within sixty days after the hydraulic fracture stimulation is performed,
the owner, operator, or service company shall post on the fracfocus [sic] chemical disclosure
registry all elements made viewable by the fracfocus website.”).
75.
See id. § 43-02-03-27.1(3) (imposing the requirement).
76.
Id. § 43-02-03-30.1.
77.
See id. § 43-02-03-30 (imposing the requirement).
78.
See id. § 43-02-03-19 (imposing the requirements).
79.
See id. § 43-02-03-19.1 (imposing the requirements).
80.
Id. § 43-02-03-19.3.
81.
Id. (emphasis added). The emphasized section would appear to include flowback
water from fracturing operations when read alongside the definition of “completion” in § 4302-03-01(13) of the North Dakota Administrative Code, which states that a well is
considered completed when oil or gas begins to flow from the well after the casing has been
run.
82.
Id. § 43-02-03-19.2. See also id. § 43-02-03-19.3 (providing for disposal of
materials temporarily stored in on-site pits in accordance with subsection 19.2).
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the relevant material, must be reclaimed within thirty days of cessation of
operations unless an extension is granted, and in no case may be left for
more than one year thereafter.83
Taking these regulations at face value, there appear to be
substantial curbs in North Dakota’s law to prevent the kinds of releases
from hydraulic fracturing operations that appear most likely to cause
environmental damage. The various regulatory requirements, read together,
make it appear that compliance (even for hydraulic fracturing operations)
requires operation in such a way as to avoid the releases of pollutants onto
surface soil or into groundwater.84 However, this assumes that compliance
is effectively and rigorously enforced –an assumption that may not be well
founded.85
Looking only to what private means are available, state statutes do
provide some measure of leverage for private landowners, in close
proximity to a well, to seek recourse against polluters. 86 For damages
stemming from oil and gas production generally, owners of property
adjacent to a well may demand an inspection by the state if hydrogen
sulfide is present, in which case the state is authorized to take remedial
measures.87 Surface owners of land, but evidently not others near a well,88
are entitled to damages sustained by the surface owner to his land for “lost
land value, lost use . . . and lost value of improvements caused by drilling
operations.”89 Finally, any property owner with property one mile or less
83.
Id. § 41-02-03-19.3.
84.
See id. § 43-02-03-30.1 (prohibiting spills or leaks from flowing over the surface
or infiltrating soil). It would thus appear that oil and gas operators would have to fulfill the
other requirements imposed on them—such as § 43-02-03-21 (requiring casing and
cementing sufficient to protect nearby fresh water), § 43-02-03-19 (governing construction
and design of drilling sites), or § 43-02-03-19.3 (governing temporary storage of fracturing
fluids at drilling sites)—in such a way as to meet the requirements of subsection 30.1.
85.
See Cox, supra note 46, at 25–26 (noting that the EPA has found that states have
generally devoted inadequate resources toward compliance inspections and legal
enforcement); New Oil Inspectors to Step Up ND Oversight, THE BISMARCK TRIBUNE, (May
19,
2011),
http://bismarcktribune.com/news/new-oil-inspectors-to-step-up-ndoversight/article_7ae659c8-8227-11e0-9418-001cc4c03286.html (reporting that the state
Department of Mineral Resources intended to increase its inspection staff from fourteen,
able to inspect a well every six months, to twenty-four by June 2013, allowing monthly
inspections) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
86.
The viability of common-law causes of action will not be considered here, but are
reviewed infra at 331–39.
87.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-03.1 (2011) (establishing the right “to protect the
health and safety of the surface owner's health, welfare, and property.”).
88.
See Kartch v. EOG Resources, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1001–02 (D.N.D. 2012)
(treating the relevant context of the statute as involving the relationship between surface
owners and mineral owners where ownership overlaps, because of the conflicts caused by
treating the mineral estate as dominant).
89.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (2011).
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away from an oil or gas well is entitled to costs and damages for diminution
of water quality or actions taken to restore water availability.90
A similar scheme exists for damage caused by subsurface
exploration, including hydraulic fracturing.91 Surface owners and adjacent
landowners are entitled to demand inspection of a well by the state “as
necessary to ensure compliance with applicable environmental protection
laws and regulations . . . .”92 Substantially similar damages are afforded to
surface owners from interference by owners of the mineral estate.93 But as
to groundwater, although damages rights are also afforded to all landowners
within one mile of the mineral production site (subject, however, to a sixyear statute of limitations), there is also an affirmative requirement on the
operator to inventory groundwater wells within one-half mile of exploration
sites and one mile of production sites.94 Although these causes of action
provide limited, if substantial, rights to landowners against operators, it
should also be noted that none of the rights in either section excludes
remedies under other causes of action.95
Montana law provides a number of requirements analogous to those
in North Dakota, with certain key differences, particularly on the issues of
holding and disposal of wastewater. In Montana, the state has established a
Board of Oil and Gas Conservation that has the authority to oversee
injection wells and hydraulic fracturing operations, and is tasked with
preventing contamination of surrounding land or extraneous underground
strata.96 The statute compels the board to require operators to file well logs,
drill and case wells in a way that prevents the movement of oil and gas into
other strata and prevents pollution of fresh water, and restore surface land
to its previous condition. 97 Issuance of a drilling permit depends on

90.
See id. § 38-11.1-06 (2011) (outlining the extent of the cause of action).
91.
See id. § 38-11.2-01 (2011) (defining “drilling operations” within the context of
the statute as including the drilling of an extraction well “and the injection, production, and
completion operations ensuing from the drilling”).
92.
Id. § 38-22.1-02 (2011).
93.
See id. § 38-11.2-04 (2011) (reiterating damages rights for harm and disruption
caused by the operator).
94.
See id. § 38-11.2-07 (2011) (establishing the requirements).
95.
See id. §38-11.1-10 (2011) (“The remedies provided by this chapter do not
preclude any person from seeking other remedies allowed by law.”); § 38-11.2-08 (2011)
(same).
96.
See Kulander, supra note 66, at 25 (describing the board as the “primary
authority” for Montana’s Underground Injection Control program and hydraulic fracturing);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-111 (2011) (establishing the board’s duties, including
“prevent[ing] contamination of or damage to surrounding land or underground strata,” and
powers, including revoking, denying, and conditioning permits, as well as inspection and
monitoring of production operations).
97.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-123 (2011) (establishing statutory requirements for
oil and gas production).
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compliance “in all respects with the applicable rules of the board,”98 which
rules include requirements for well spacing, drilling procedures, well
stimulation, and production.99 A well at which hydraulic fracturing is to be
conducted requires an application describing the location of the operation
and the geologic conditions of the well, a description of the well casing and
cementing (which must be sufficient to prevent fluid migration into potable
waters), and a statement if surface pits will be used to store fluids prior to
injection.100
Montana also imposes certain substantive standards for the quality
of wells and casings required of operators. Wells are required to be drilled
using freshwater drilling fluid or air when drilling a surface hole or through
freshwater aquifers, and to have “sufficient casing . . . to protect all fresh
water located at levels reasonably accessible for agricultural and domestic
use.”101 For rotary drilling specifically, the rule requires casing to be set in
an “impervious formation” and sufficiently cemented to withstand “a
compressive strength of 300 pounds per square inch . . . .”102 Moreover,
operators are required to subject all new wells to a mechanical integrity test
(at a pressure between 300 and 800 PSI, depending on actual injection
pressure), in order to ensure that there are no significant leaks in the tubing
or casing, or “significant movement of injected fluid in vertical channels
adjacent to the wellbore” that would threaten fresh water supplies in higher
strata. 103 The rules do not permit a well that has failed a mechanical
integrity test or experienced one of several specified mechanical failures in
the course of operation to continue operating until it can be repaired, and a
successful integrity test completed.104 Operators are also required to file a
report detailing work done on a well within thirty days of the well’s
completion.105
Montana has also recently revised its oil and gas regulations in
order to address issues related to hydraulic fracturing, promulgating several
new requirements in 2011 that govern fracking operations.106 For hydraulic
fracturing to be permitted under an operator’s permit, it must have been
included in the initial application; or else (in the case of exploratory wells
where the need for fracking was not anticipated) information about the
98.
MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.604 (2012).
99.
See id. 36.22.701–36.22.1245 (establishing these requirements).
100.
See id. 36.22.1403 (2012) (enumerating the required components of applications
for Class II injection wells).
101.
Id. 36.22.1001 (imposing these requirements on rotary-drilled wells), 36.22.1002
(imposing these requirements on cable-drilled wells).
102.
Id. 36.22.1001 (describing the casing requirements).
103.
Id. 36.22.1416 (describing the required integrity test).
104.
See id. 36.22.1416(7)–(8) (barring both classes of failing well from service).
105.
See id. 36.22.1011 (requiring the report).
106.
See Kulander, supra note 66, at 25 (discussing the new regulations, which took
effect Aug. 27, 2011).
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proposed operation must be submitted at least forty-eight hours before it is
to be commenced.107 The rules further require the disclosure of the methods
used for any and all well treatments, including type of treatment and
maximum pressure recorded; and in the case of hydraulic fracturing,
disclosure of all treatment fluids used, broken down by type, rate of use,
and concentration of each chemical. 108 The fracking disclosure
requirements may be satisfied by submission of the required information to
FracFocus or “successor . . . publicly accessible Internet information
repositories . . . .”109 A separate casing integrity test is also required before
an operator is permitted to conduct a fracturing operation.110
Montana’s rules include comparable provisions for the disposal of
wastewater from fracturing operations. The rules’ treatment of flowback
water is not entirely clear because, as a general matter, the rules prohibit
storage of a variety of oil wastes and other “hazardous or deleterious
substances” in “earthen storage pits or in open vessels,” which is a
definition that might capture flowback water in certain circumstances.111
Use of open pits to store hazardous substances is limited to emergencies,
not including “spills from an improperly or inadequately designed or
maintained production facility,” and must be disposed within forty-eight
hours “in a manner that will not degrade surface water or groundwater or
cause harm to soils.” 112 However, the rules also contain provisions

107.
See MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.608 (2012) (discussing the extent to which permits
cover well stimulation activities). See also id. 36.22.1010 (discussing prior notification,
approval, and subsequent reporting required for chemical stimulation or hydraulic fracturing
to be authorized).
108.
See id. 36.22.1015 (2012) (describing the disclosure requirements).
109.
Id. The rules permit less extensive disclosure in order to protect chemicals that are
trade secrets, requiring more extensive disclosure only if needed to respond to a spill or
release, diagnosis or treatment of an exposed individual, or treatment of a medical
emergency. See id. 36.22.1016 (describing the trade secrets exception).
110.
See id. 36.22.1106 (providing for casing pressure testing and other safety
requirements prior to a fracturing operation, including use of a fracturing string if the casing
fails the integrity test). Compare id. 36.22.1106 (requiring at 30-minute pressure test at the
“maximum anticipated treating pressure minus the annulus pressure”) with id. 36.22.1416
(requiring, for ordinary casing, a 15-minute pressure test at the greater of 100 PSI above the
actual injection pressure at testing time or 300 PSI, but in no event greater than 800 PSI).
111.
See id. 36.22.1207 (prohibiting storage in open pits or vessels); id. 36.22.302(37)
(defining “hazardous substance” as any substance so defined in § 75-10-701 of the Montana
Code); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-710 (defining “hazardous or deleterious substance” as
any substance constituting an “imminent and substantial threat to . . . the environment” and
designated hazardous under CERCLA); 40 C.F.R. 302.4 (2012) (including benzene, ethylene
glycol, and naphthalene among substances designated hazardous under CERCLA). No
reported case law has been found interpreting these provisions.
112.
MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1207 (2012).
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specifically for disposal of produced water113 with more than 15,000 PPM
of dissolved solids that permit disposal into a “board-approved . . . earthen
pit” so long as the maximum amount disposed does not exceed five barrels
daily over a monthly basis.114 Alternatively, such water may be disposed of
by underground injection into a Class II well or, if the concentration of
dissolved solids is at or below 15,000 PPM, through “any manner allowed
by law that does not degrade surface waters or groundwater or cause harm
to soils.”115 Earthen pits, if used, must be expressly permitted by the board,
and must be constructed in accord with a number of requirements provided
by the rules.116
Montana law also includes remedial provisions for surface owners
whose use of their land is disrupted by oil and gas development.117 Oil and
gas developers are also made generally liable for all damage to real or
personal property resulting from “lack of ordinary care” or from “oil and
gas operations and production.” 118 Separate from damages, civil and
criminal liability may attach to an individual who violates the state oil and
gas statutes or an administrative rule to which the person is subject,
although ability to bring suit is vested specifically in the Board of Oil and
Gas Conservation.119 The board is also authorized to take action in cases of
emergency involving an actual or impending violation “that, if it occurs or
continues, will cause substantial pollution” and produce enduring harmful
effects that endanger public health, safety, or welfare.120 Under that power,
the board is entitled to close or shut down a well, or to impose restrictions
on operation, and may do so without prior notice or hearing offered to the
alleged violator.121 Although Montana’s law differs from North Dakota’s, in
113.
Although the rules do not define this term directly, they define “produced fluid” as
“any fluid, including oil, gas, and water, originating from subsurface geologic sources.” Id.
36.22.302(60).
114.
Id. 36.22.1226.
115.
Id.
116.
See id. 36.22.1227 (requiring liners, dikes, use of specified materials, and
compliance with fencing and netting provisions of the rules).
117.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504 (2011) (providing the owners of surface
estates with a cause of action for “loss of agricultural production and income, lost land
value, and lost value of improvements from oil and gas operations.”).
118.
Id. § 82-10-505.
119.
See Kulander, supra note 66, at 26 (describing the violation prohibitions); MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 82-10-147 (granting the board the right to sue over violations, assess an
administrative penalty up to $125K, issue compliance orders, and seek injunctions); id. § 8210-148 (declaring violations and attempts to falsify records a misdemeanor subject to a
maximum $10,000 fine per day an imprisonment up to six months); id. § 82-10-149
(declaring each day of noncompliance a misdemeanor subject to a maximum $10,000 fine
per day).
120.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-151(1) (authorizing board action in emergencies).
121.
Id. § 82-11-151 (outlining the board’s powers and providing for notice and hearing
after the board’s emergency action).
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that Montana lacks the North Dakota provision entitling nearby landowners
to take action against polluters,122 oil and gas operators would nevertheless
appear to be subject to the general state requirements for water quality,
which entitle the state to issue orders to clean up any spills that may pollute
state waters.123
The differences between these regulatory schemes are subtle, but
they appear potentially significant. Whereas Montana permits the
maintenance of wastewater storage pits in certain circumstances and to a
limited extent beyond emergency situations, 124 North Dakota imposes a
largely unqualified proscription of all non-emergency unenclosed surface
storage.125 Both states provide that their oil and gas regulatory agencies are
charged with environmental protection as well as development, and are
entitled to use permitting as a way to ensure environmental safety.126 But
Montana’s rules provide only for environmental regulation by public
agencies; there is no analogue in the rules governing mining to North
Dakota’s private causes of action for property owners other than the owners
of surface estates.127 In this regard in particular, Montana’s law appears less
favorable than North Dakota’s, in that it would make it more difficult for
private property owners, tribal or otherwise, in the border regions of a
reservation to exercise leverage over off-reservation polluters without such
a legal basis. The difference at least eliminates one potential remedy, were
there to be a leak or spill, under Montana law.
IV. Reservation Jurisdiction, Federal Regulation, and the Trust
Relationship
Although the state regulations discussed above are a necessary
consideration—for the sake of comparison, as well as for property along
jurisdictional borders where it is directly relevant—most significant for
122.
See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text (discussing North Dakota law’s
private rights of action for damages to water quality and other land uses).
123.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-601 (“The department may issue an order to a
person to clean up any material that the person or the person's employee, agent, or
subcontractor has accidentally or purposely dumped, spilled, or otherwise deposited in or
near state waters and that may pollute state waters.”). See also id. §§ 75-5-601 et seq.
(outlining the enforcement and penalty provisions).
124.
See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text (outlining the Montana rules for
wastewater pits).
125.
See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text (outlining the North Dakota rules
for wastewater pits).
126.
See supra notes 66–69, 96–100 and accompanying text (discussing agency
authority and permitting restrictions).
127.
Compare supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text (summarizing the private
causes of action in North Dakota) with supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text
(imposing liability for property damages, but providing no specific private cause of action).
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fracturing in Indian country are the rules directly applicable to reservations.
BLM’s new regulations specifically on fracturing128 are part of these rules,
but it is necessary to outline the jurisdictional framework of oil and gas
regulation in Indian country before the new regulations may be considered.
In most respects, Indian tribes are in a position of jurisdictional
parity with states—that is, state law and regulation does not apply within
Indian reservation boundaries, generally leaving the reservations subject
only to tribal and federal law. 129 This status reflects tribes’ reserved
sovereignty, or those powers of self-government derived from tribes’
original status as independent nations. 130 Where civil and regulatory
jurisdiction is concerned, matters relating to tribal member Indians in
Indian country are subject to tribal jurisdiction, unless federal law creates
an exemption.131The property or activities of nonmembers or non-Indians in
Indian country also fall outside state regulation if state interference would
hinder tribal government or federal law. 132 Tribes’ ability to impose
regulations on Indian land or federal trust land, even if it affects nonIndians, is generally unquestioned. 133 Tribes’ ability to regulate may be
limited if the regulation affects activities of nonmembers on non-Indian fee
lands; however, under Montana v. United States, tribal regulation applies if
the nonmembers have entered a consensual relationship with the tribe, or if
the relevant activity has “some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” 134 Given the
economic prominence and potential ecological perils of oil and gas
production generally, and hydraulic fracturing specifically, it is reasonable
to presume that tribal regulatory jurisdiction would survive the Montana

128.
See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (introducing the regulations).
129.
See COHEN, supra note 64, § 3.04[1] (“‘Generally speaking, primary jurisdiction
over land that is Indian country rests with the Federal Government and the Indian tribe
inhabiting it, and not with the States.’” (quoting Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S.
520, 527 n.1 (1998))); id. §6.01[2] (“[S]tate law generally is not applicable to Indian affairs
within the territory of an Indian tribe, absent the consent of Congress.”).
130.
See id. § 4.01[1][a], at 207–08 (noting that the basic principle of Indian law is that
tribal sovereignty is not a delegated power, but is derived from the incidents of independent
nationhood not defeated by the federal-tribal relationship).
131.
See id. § 6.01[1], at 489 (“Congress’s plenary authority over Indian affairs and the
tradition of tribal autonomy in Indian country combine to preempt the operation of state
law.”).
132.
See id. at 490 (describing the conditions for tribal regulation of non-Indians).
133.
See id. § 6.02[2][a], at 506 (“[The Supreme] Court has never struck down a tribal
tax or regulation of non-Indians engaged in a transaction or activity on Indian land.”). See
also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 139–41 (1982) (upholding an oil & gas
severance tax on a non-Indian company and noting the tribe’s inherent power to tax as “an
essential instrument of self-government”).
134.
Id. § 6.02[2][b], at 507–08 (quoting Montana v. United States, 405 U.S. 544, 565–
66 (1981)).
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test. 135 But it should also be noted that nonmember conduct or property
does not necessarily fall under state jurisdiction simply because it falls
outside tribal jurisdiction.136 The state may not assert its authority when
doing so would conflict with preemptive federal law or would interfere with
reservation Indians’ right to tribal lawmaking.137
Oil and gas development specifically is subject to a complex of
federal and tribal interests, laws, and regulations. Mineral estates within
reservation boundaries may be owned by tribes or individuals (particularly
where lands were alienated from tribal holdings by allotment), while tribes
may also have rights in mineral estates that extend outside reservation
boundaries where land was ceded for homesteading or federal use.138 Where
lands are held in trust for the tribe or individuals by the federal government,
which acts in a fiduciary capacity, the tribe or the individual is the
beneficial owner of the mineral estate, and may have enforceable rights in
cases of federal mismanagement.139
Under the Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA),140 tribes may
enter into leases or other minerals agreements that provide for the
exploration and production of oil and gas, among other resources, from any
estate “in which such Indian tribe owns a beneficial or restricted interest,”
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 141 Secretarial
approval depends on a finding that the agreement “is in the best interest of
the Indian tribe” or individual Indian parties, based on potential economic
returns and “environmental, social, and cultural effects” on the tribe that
135.
See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Fracking, Tribal Sovereignty, the Montana Test,
and the Turtle Mountain Band, TURTLE TALK (Nov. 28, 2011, 3:56 PM),
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2011/11/28/fracking-tribal-sovereignty-the-montana-testand-the-turtle-mountain-band/ (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment).
136.
See COHEN, supra note 64, § 6.03[2][c], at 528–30 (discussing cases to the effect
that tribal jurisdiction and state authority entail separate inquiries).
137.
See id. § 6.03[2][a], at 517–18 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 219 (1959))
(discussing the dual barriers to state jurisdiction, beyond Montana’s provisions). States’
rights to exercise civil jurisdiction over Indian country would be different if a reservation has
been subject to Pub. L. No. 83-280, which provided a superseding federal vehicle for state
jurisdiction; but this is not directly relevant for the purposes of this note, as Montana and
North Dakota were not so subject. See id. § 6.04[3], at 537–78 (discussing the history and
complex effects of the law).
138.
See id. § 17.03[1], at 1120–22 (discussing mineral ownership).
139.
See id. § 17.01, at 1106 (discussing generally beneficial rights to natural resources
on tribal or allotted land); id. § 17.03[4], at 1137–41 (discussing cases of trust liability and
mixed results).
140.
Indian Mineral Development Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2102–2108 (2011).
141.
25 U.S.C. § 2102 (2011). See also COHEN, supra note 64, § 17.03[2][b], at 1129–
30 (discussing these provisions of the IMDA). Secretarial approval would not be required if
a tribe sought to develop such a resource on its own, without the involvement of extrinsic
parties. See id. § 17.03[3], at 1134 n.128 (“If a tribe develops its own mineral resources, no
secretarial approval is required . . .”).
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may result from approval. 142 Liability under the trust relationship could
follow from a failure to make a best-interest determination, to conduct
royalties accounting so as to maximize tribal interests, to consider potential
economic benefit, or to consider factors other than economic benefit.143 The
IMDA also preserved tribes’ ability to enter into minerals agreements under
the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,144 which had instituted uniform
leasing procedures for tribal land: ten-year leases, requiring prior tribal
consent and Secretarial approval.145
In the context of federal regulation, the authority of the Secretary of
the Interior to manage Indian mineral leasing, and oil and gas operations on
federal land generally, has been delegated to the Bureau of Land
Management. 146 BLM, in turn, has issued seven Onshore Oil and Gas
Orders, including orders that govern approval of operations, drilling, and
disposal of produced water.147 These orders apply to oil and gas leases on
Indian trust or allotment trust land, as well as agreements under the
IMDA.148 Unlike the states’ regulations, however, BLM’s requirements for
oil and gas exploration and production are not made part of the Code of
Federal Regulations, but are instead kept as separate orders, and are partly
142.
25 U.S.C. § 2103 (2011). Because approval by the Secretary constitutes major
federal action for the purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act, an Environmental
Impact Statement must be prepared before the Secretary may approve a minerals agreement.
See COHEN, supra note 64, § 17.03[3], at 1134 (discussing the NEPA implications of
Secretarial approval).
143.
See id. § 17.03[4], at 1138–39 (summarizing cases and holdings on federal
government liability under the trust relationship).
144.
25 U.S.C. §§ 396a–396g (2011).
145.
See COHEN, supra note 64, §17.03[2][a], at 1124–25 (summarizing the 1938 Act).
146.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 1, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,329, 10,329 (Mar. 7, 2007)
(“The Secretary of the Interior has delegated this [management] authority to the Bureau of
Land Management . . . .”); 43 C.F.R. § 3164.1 (2011) (authorizing the BLM director to issue
onshore oil and gas orders); 25 C.F.R. § 211.4 (2011) (authorizing BLM to approve and
enforce drilling permits on tribal land); id. § 212.4 (authorizing BLM to approve and enforce
drilling permits on allotted land). While BLM permitting is a practical reality, there are
nevertheless credible arguments to be made that the present regulatory structure is unlawful
because of the way BLM has come about its delegated authority. See CERT comment, supra
note 10, at 4–5 (arguing that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43
U.S.C. § 1702 et seq., denies BLM authority over Indian land, invalidating the Secretary’s
delegation of authority as ultra vires); Tom Fredericks & Andrea Aseff, When Did Congress
Deem Indian Lands Public Lands?: The Problem of BLM Exercising Oil and Gas
Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 33 ENERGY L.J. 199, 136–41 (2012) (arguing
that, in addition to the statutory limitations, the secretarial delegation gives BIA, not BLM,
authority over Indian minerals management, and that BIA’s delegation of that authority to
BLM through a memorandum of understanding was unlawful).
147.
See 43 C.F.R. § 3164.1 (2011) (listing the orders currently in effect and their
locations in the Federal Register).
148.
See, e.g., Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 1, supra note 146, at 10,329 (stating that
the order applies to onshore leases of “Indian oil and gas,” defined as mineral interests on
tribal or allotment trust land, and IMDA agreements).
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summarized in the Bureau’s “Gold Book” of standards and guidelines for
operators.149 With the exception of Order No. 1, concerning the application
requirements for oil and gas producers, none of the orders has been updated
in the last twenty years or more.150
As a precondition of approval, operators are required first to submit
a plan detailing the scope of the project, targeted strata, means for
preventing blowouts, proposed casings and cement design criteria, expected
pressures encountered in the course of drilling and operation, testing and
logging procedures, and any other relevant aspects of the proposal, all of
which are expressly required to comply with Order No. 2.151 Under that
order, casing and cementing must be adequate to “protect and/or isolate all
usable water zones” and must run to an adequate depth to contain the
pressure experienced during normal operations. 152 Casing and cementing
must also meet a variety of standard specifications and pass pressure
testing, subject to compliance remedies also specified in the rule.153 Order
No. 1 further requires submission of a plan for surface use, which in part
must be designed to provide “for safe operations, adequate protection of
surface resources, groundwater, and other environmental components;”
define locations for reserve pits to be located on site; identify prospective
water supplies and intended methods of waste disposal; and make plans for
surface reclamation. 154 Similarly, operators are required to “conduct
operations to minimize adverse effects to surface and subsurface resources,
prevent unnecessary surface disturbance, and conform with currently
available technology and practice,” as well as to comply with applicable
statutes, including NEPA and the Endangered Species Act. 155 The rules
affirmatively require “immediate action” by operators to “safeguard life or
prevent significant environmental degradation,” as well as notification of
the surface managing agency, and surface owner if appropriate, within
149.
See id. at 10,328 (“The following Order would be implemented by BLM and the
[Forest Service,] but will not be codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.”); U.S. DEP’T
OF THE INTERIOR AND U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SURFACE OPERATING STANDARDS AND
GUIDELINES FOR OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (2007) [hereinafter Gold
Book] (“The Gold Book provides operators with a combination of guidance and standards
for ensuring compliance with agency policies and operating requirements, such as those
found in the Code of Federal Regulations [and] Onshore Oil and Gas Orders . . . .”).
150.
See 43 C.F.R. § 3164.1 (listing the effective dates of each order, the most recent
revisions being Order No. 1 in 2007 and Order No. 7 in 1993).
151.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 1, supra note 146, at 10,331 (establishing the
drilling plan application requirements).
152.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 2, 53 Fed. Reg. 46,798, 46,808 (Nov. 18,
1988) (establishing the casing and cementing requirements).
153.
See id. at 46,808–09 (describing the casing requirements, the gravity of violations,
and the prescribed remedial action).
154.
Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 1, supra note 146, at 10,331–33.
155.
Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 1, supra note 146, at 10,335.
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twenty-four hours of the emergency. 156 An environmental review that
complies with NEPA and other applicable environmental regulations will
be conducted following the agency’s receipt of an application.157
If Indian land is involved, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is
established as the surface managing agency, and operators are required to
go to BIA and tribal offices to obtain the appropriate use or access permits,
or an appropriate surface access agreement in cases of divided estates.158
Applicable statutes may require surveys in order to protect cultural
resources prior to approval.159 BLM will also take account of BIA and tribal
recommendations for conditions to be placed on permits prior to
approval.160
Order No. 7 provides generally applicable requirements for storage
and disposal of water that mirror the regulations imposed by states.161 The
Order provides that disposal may be accomplished by underground
injection (the preferred means), discharge into pits, or other methods
approved by BLM officials including surface discharge pursuant to an
NPDES permit; but in any event, no disposal is permitted without approval
of the authorized official.162 Authorized officers are also entitled to impose
additional requirements upon operators’ management of produced water, as
when environmental problems have arisen or water quality has degraded so
as to require other measures.163 Water from well completion activities may
be temporarily stored in reserve pits for up to 90 days, with storage
thereafter requiring approval of the officer.164 The Order also provides a

156.
Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 1, supra note 146, at 10,335–36.
157.
See Gold Book, supra note 149, at 2 (“Upon receipt of a complete APD . . . the
BLM, the surface management agency, or the agency’s or operator’s environmental
contractor will conduct an environmental analysis . . . in conformance with the requirements
of NEPA and the regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality . . . .”).
158.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 1, supra note 146, at 10,336–37 (imposing
requirements for Indian oil and gas leases). The rules also make provision for obtaining
authorization for staking and surveying on Indian land, authorizing entry if a majority of
owners consent or if BIA has approved access in cases of extensive fractionation. See id. at
10,330–31 (discussing access arrangements for staking and surveying).
159.
See Gold Book, supra note 149, at 9–10 (discussing permit approval plans).
160.
See Gold Book, supra note 149, at 12 (discussing BLM treatment of Indian lands).
161.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, 58 Fed. Reg. 47,361, 47,361–65 (providing
the final text of the Order).
162.
See id. at 47,362 (discussing general requirements for water disposal). See also 43
C.F.R. § 3162.5-1 (requiring disposal by subsurface injection, approved pits, or other means
approved by the authorized officer).
163.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,362 (noting the
officers’ authorization to impose conditions upon written justification).
164.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,362 (discussing
general use of reserve pits).
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variety of notice requirements and other provisions governing disposal
requests in various circumstances.165
As to the substantive requirements for various disposal methods,
the Order requires underground injection to be done in an injection well
with a valid Underground Injection Control permit (issued by the relevant
agency, which may be a tribe if it has “achieved primacy”), and to comply
with the procedural requirements of Order No. 1 and the well engineering
requirements of Order No. 2. 166 Disposal by surface discharge requires
submission of the valid NPDES permit, as well as disclosure of a water
quality analysis and the design of the disposal site.167
Disposal pits require extensive disclosure to the approving officer,
including disclosure of the sources of produced water, a reclamation plan
for the site, a contingency plan for emergencies, and samples of water from
the discharge source for analysis. 168 Approval of lined pits requires
disclosure of a map of the site, disposal rate, water contents (including
dissolved solids and toxic constituents), method of disposing of precipitated
solids, and the material used for and installation method of the pit liner.169
Unlined pits are subject to a different set of criteria, which include a
threshold showing that less than five barrels of water will be disposed per
day, the water has no more dissolved solids than existing protected water,
the water will not degrade area surface or subsurface waters, or that at least
a substantial part of the water is being used for beneficial purposes and
meets minimum standards for those uses.170 Operators must further make
disclosures comparable to those required for lined pits, as well as
percolation rate of area soil, known aquifers and mineral deposits in the
area, and further disclosures related to the threshold criterion underlying the
application. 171 Applications for emergency pits are dealt with separately;

165.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47362–63 (establishing
different notice provisions depending on the disposal method and whether the disposal site is
federal/tribal or state land, on-lease or off-lease).
166.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,363 (imposing
informational requirements for injection wells).
167.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,365 (imposing
requirements for surface discharges). Note that the Order requires unauthorized discharges to
be disclosed to the authorized BLM officer. Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note
161, at 47,365.
168.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,363 (imposing
informational requirements for disposal pits generally).
169.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,363 (imposing
substantive requirements on lined pits, to be executed by the authorizing officer).
170.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,363–64 (imposing
substantive requirements on unlined pits).
171.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,364 (imposing
substantive requirements on unlined pits).
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their use is limited to forty-eight hours unless an authorized officer permits
otherwise.172
The Order also imposes substantive construction standards for pits
of both kinds. Pits must be on level ground away from drainage pathways,
with adequate storage capacity, fencing and means to prevent entry by
birds, and must meet stated criteria for grading and free board.173 Lined pits
are further required to be lined with impervious materials that will be
resistant to the contents of produced water and to have systems in place for
the detection of leaks. 174 Pits that fall short of these standards are not
approved unless a variance is issued.175
These regulations appear to have already imposed substantial
controls on resource extraction from federal and tribal land, albeit not
without pushback from some tribes.176 As under state regulations, operators
under the federal rules are subject to oversight of the nature and extent of
drilling, as well as to substantive requirements for casing and wellbore
integrity.177 The federal rules also impose broadly comparable requirements
on the use of pits to store flowback water, appearing to take a more
permissive approach to their use while imposing more specific construction
requirements.178 But the current federal regulations are, in fact, substantially
172.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,364 (discussing
requirements applicable to emergency pits).
173.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,364 (imposing
construction requirements for pits).
174.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,364 (imposing
construction requirements specific to lined pits).
175.
See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 7, supra note 161, at 47,364 (imposing
penalty for noncompliant proposals).
176.
See Bureau of Land Management’s Hydraulic Fracturing Rule’s Impacts on
Indian Tribal Energy Development: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Indian and Alaska
Native Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Wilson Groen, President and CEO, Navajo
Nation Oil & Gas Co.) [hereinafter Groen testimony] (arguing that industry best practices
are adequate protection, and that current rules already erect “unique hurdles” to tribal energy
development); Bureau of Land Management’s Hydraulic Fracturing Rule’s Impacts on
Indian Tribal Energy Development: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Indian and Alaska
Native Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of T.J. Show, Chairman, Blackfeet Tribal
Business Council) [hereinafter Show testimony] (discussing delays and costs of the current
regulatory scheme).
177.
Compare supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text (requiring operators to
submit drilling plans and to meet established criteria for well casing, cementing, and
pressure testing, in order to protect nearby water) with supra notes 67, 70, and
accompanying text (discussing North Dakota’s analogous regulations for well specification
and casing plans, as well as casing and cementing requirements sufficient to protect nearby
water) and supra notes 97, 100–105, and accompanying text (discussing Montana’s
analogous regulations, imposing more stringent standards for drilling so as to prevent water
pollution, applications’ requirement of drilling plans, and standards for casing, cementing,
and well integrity).
178.
Compare supra notes 164, 168–70, 172 (permitting temporary storage for 90 days
and emergency storage for 48 hours in reserve pits, but requiring disclosure before approval,
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less rigorous than their state counterparts in their treatment of hydraulic
fracturing operations; a comparison of federal rules to state laws and
regulations (many of which, on this point, are admittedly of recent vintage)
reveal a lacuna in the federal rules, with many provisions of state law
having no federal counterpart currently in force.179 This disparity at least
suggests the need for the federal rules to address hydraulic fracturing with
specificity—North Dakota and Montana, no less than tribes, have an
interest in the economic benefits of increased oil and gas production within
their jurisdictions, 180 but have nevertheless seen fit to regulate the
practice—although it does not automatically follow that Indian trust land
should fall under the same regime as public lands.

compliance with water quality and liner material standards, and fit within one of multiple
compliance categories for unlined pits) with supra notes 79–81, 83 (discussing North Dakota
regulations, limiting pit use to 72 hour emergency storage, while imposing fencing and
screening requirements and only general requirements for pit impermeability) and supra
notes 111–12, 114, 116 (discussing Montana regulations, prohibiting use of open pits to
store frack fluids; limiting emergency use to 48 hours; and imposing dike, fencing, 5
gallon/day limit, and materials requirements on produced water pits).
179.
Compare 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-2 (requiring submission of the proposed operation
beforehand only for “nonroutine” fracturing jobs, and a completion report for all jobs) with
supra notes 73–75 (discussing North Dakota’s specific fracking rules, including limits on
treatment pressure, inspection and testing requirements, fracking chemical disclosure,
official notification requirements, and prohibition of leaks) and supra notes 107–10
(discussing Montana’s specific fracking rules, including pre-fracking information disclosure,
disclosure of treatment methods and fracking chemicals, and requirements for separate
casing integrity tests). It should be noted that this comparison does not take account of EPA
or state regulation of hydraulic fracturing operations that use diesel fuels or fuel derivatives
under the Underground Injection Control program of the Safe Drinking Water Act. See 40
C.F.R. Parts 144–47. With the exception of wells on the Fort Peck reservation, EPA
administers the UIC program for all Indian lands in Montana and North Dakota. See 40
C.F.R. § 147.1351 (providing for EPA primacy over UIC wells in Indian Country in
Montana, excepting Fort Peck); 40 C.F.R. § 147.1752 (providing for EPA primacy over UIC
wells in Indian Country in North Dakota); 40 C.F.R. § 147.3200 (providing for tribal
primacy over UIC wells on the Fort Peck reservation). Because EPA has estimated that only
two percent of wells in states where it would administer the UIC program use diesel fuel in
hydraulic fracturing, these rules are considered outside the scope of this note. See 77 Fed.
Reg. 27,453 (May 20, 2012) (“[A] review of data available [through FracFocus] suggested
that approximately 2% of wells that hydraulically fracture would be subject to SDWA UIC
permitting requirements in states where EPA administers the UIC program.”) Fort Peck’s
UIC rules will be discussed alongside other tribal regulation, infra notes 292–330 and
accompanying text.
180.
See Lauren Donovan, Numbers Tell The Story of Oil in Bakken, BISMARCK
TRIBUNE, (Feb. 25, 2013), http://bismarcktribune.com/numbers-tell-the-story-of-oil-inbakken/article_a75004fe-7f6a-11e2-9b71-001a4bcf887a.html (noting that new oil
development has poised North Dakota to overtake Texas as the top national producer,
resulting in record-high revenues of $317 million in 2012 from production on state-owned
lands) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
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BLM’s proposed regulations were an attempt to fill the void in the
federal rules exposed by the rapid increase in the use of fracturing. 181
Although BLM has been widely criticized for proposing the rules after what
was perceived to be inadequate tribal consultation,182 the substance of the
rules was ostensibly intended to align with the modern requirements of state
regulation.183 In their original form, the proposed rules required preapproval
for all hydraulic fracturing, which may be obtained either during the
existing application process for new wells or, for existing wells if fracking
has not begun within five years of approval or if “significant new
information” about area geology or the operation’s effects has arisen.184 The
operator submission would now be required to include a description of the
geology and formations where the proposed stimulation operation would
take place; locations of “usable water” along with logs proving that the
water supplies are protected from contamination; water sources or base
fracking fluid used; types of proppant used; and a description of the
stimulation, including volume of fluid used, maximum treating pressure,
estimated fracture length and height, and proposed methods of handling and
disposing flowback water.185 Operators are further required to conduct a
successful mechanical integrity test of casing or casing string prior to a
181.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 27,693 (May 11, 2012) (noting that BLM’s current regulations
on fracking were last amended in 1988, “long before the latest hydraulic fracturing
technologies became widely used,” and that the bureau is following states’ lead in updating
their regulations for public lands).
182.
Compare id. (noting that BLM held four meetings in January 2012 that included
27 of 175 tribes invited to discuss the draft rules) with CERT comment, supra note 10, at
20–21 (arguing that BLM’s initial meetings were inadequate, and that the bureau
subsequently failed to respond to tribal inquiries or requests for meetings with their
governments).
183.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 27,693–94 (May 11, 2012) (asserting that BLM attempted to
“minimize any duplication between the reporting required for state regulations and for this
regulation,” to integrate the disclosure regs with FracFocus, and to give effect to state rules
where they are more stringent than federal regulations).
184.
77 Fed. Reg. 27709 (Oct. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3); see
also 77 Fed. Reg. 27695 (May 11, 2012) (noting that the new regulation would supersede the
current requirement limiting preapproval to “nonroutine” fracking and that the five-year
requirement accords with Montana’s regulations).
185.
77 Fed. Reg. 27709–10 (Oct. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R § 3162.3-3);
see also 77 Fed. Reg. 27695–97 (May 11, 2012) (discussing the public health and safety
purposes of the various requirements). The federal regulations speak in terms of “usable
water” because “BLM has sought to protect all usable waters during drilling operations, not
just fresh water” with the intention “to be more protective” of lower-quality water. Id. at
27695. Whereas the Montana rules speak in terms of “prevent[ing] . . . pollution of fresh
water supplies” in their imposition of administrative duties, MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11123(3), the North Dakota rules are broader, requiring confinement of “[a]ll freshwaters and
waters of present or probable value for domestic, commercial, or stock purposes,” N.D.
ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-20. The usable water standard has been criticized as imposing
inordinate costs by requiring longer casings to provide adequate protection. See CERT
comment, supra note 10, at 22–23 (projecting a cost increase of at least $74,000 per well).
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fracturing operation.186 Pressure must be monitored during the course of the
operation, and unexpected increases in pressure reported if they exceed a
specified threshold.187
After the fracturing operation is complete, operators would be
required to report, within thirty days of the operation, the actual results of
the operation, fluid sources used, and actual surface pressure experienced;
actual fracture length and height; and the actual method of fluid disposal
used from the site.188 Use of unlined pits for the storage of recovered fluids
is apparently made impermissible, as the proposed rule provides only for
storage in tanks or lined pits.189 Following completion, operators would also
be required to disclose all additives used in the fracturing fluid, organized
by trade name and purpose, as well as the chemical makeup by mass of all
fracturing fluids used over the course of the completion operation.190 The
additive components would ultimately be publicly disclosed through
FracFocus.191
The revisions to the proposed rules make substantive changes to the
original proposal; but with a few exceptions that are significant for the
purposes of this note, the amendments do not drastically depart from the
original proposal.192 The revision expressly requires fracturing operations to
186.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 27710 (Oct. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(d))
(deeming said test successful if at least 90 percent pressure is maintained for 30 minutes).
BLM has pointed out that this standard is already in effect under Onshore Oil and Gas Order
No. 2. See 77 Fed. Reg. 27697 (May 11, 2012) (“This requirement is the same standard
applied in Onshore Order Number 2 . . . to confirm the mechanical integrity of the casing.”).
187.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 27710 (Oct. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(e))
(requiring monitoring of annulus pressure and reporting within 24 hours if pressure exceeds
500 PSI, and a subsequent report within 15 days). See also 77 Fed. Reg. 27697 (May 11,
2012) (“Unexpected changes . . . would provide an early indication of the possibility that
well integrity has been compromised.”).
188.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 27710–11 (Oct. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.33(g)) (requiring specified disclosures after well completion).
189.
See id. at 27710 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(f)) (requiring recovered
fluid to be stored in either lined pits or tanks). See also 77 Fed. Reg. 27697 (May 11, 2012)
(noting that this requirement is consistent with API recommendations, and is made necessary
by the potential presence of hydrocarbons or additives in flowback water that “might
degrade surface and ground water if they were to be released without treatment”). BLM
subsequently clarified that the rule was intended to supersede Onshore Order No. 7 in the
context of hydraulic fracturing and to permit storage in only lined pits or tanks. See revised
rules, supra note 6, at 82 (“Onshore Order No. 7 allows disposal of produced water in
unlined pits in certain circumstances. The BLM does not believe that storage of hydraulic
fracturing flowback fluids in unlined pits is appropriate . . . .”)
190.
See id. (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(g)(4)–(5)) (requiring two tables
describing the additive components as part of the post-completion disclosure).
191.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 27698 (May 11, 2012) (“The BLM . . . is working with the
Ground Water Protection Council in an effort to integrate this information into the existing
Web site known as FracFocus.org.”).
192.
See revised rules, supra note 6, at 22–23 (summarizing the revisions).
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comply with the performance standard for well operators to isolate usable
water sources.193 It also streamlines the pre-fracturing approval process by
eliminating the requirements that a compliance certification and a cement
bond log be submitted before fracturing begins, and by allowing multiple
similar wells to be considered for approval in tandem. 194 Chemical
disclosures may also be made through means other than FracFocus, and the
chemical reporting burden has been substantially reduced. 195 Where
fracturing chemicals’ composition is a protected trade secret, the revision
would permit operators to withhold details of the chemicals used, providing
only an affidavit that the chemicals are exempt from disclosure.196
The revision also strengthens some aspects of the regulation,
creating a new required report on the success of corrections to inadequate
well cementing before fracturing operations begin. 197 Operators are also
required to run at least one of a number of cement evaluation logs on casing
segments that protect usable water,198 as well as make additional disclosures
for fracture mapping and operation monitoring, particularly where fractures
approach usable water sources.199 Tribes are also given authority to specify
and exempt aquifers or water-bearing rock strata from the “usable water”
classification that triggers some of the heightened requirements for
operators.200 Finally, the revision includes a variance procedure whereby
tribes could make Indian land exempt from parts of the federal rules, so

193.
See revised rules, supra note 6, at 24 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(b))
(adding a new paragraph on isolation of usable water).
194.
See id. at 24–25 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(d)) (making the
amendments and deletion). The period for reporting incidents of excessive annulus pressure
has also been lengthened from 15 to 30 days. See id. at 28 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. §
3162.3-3(g)(2)) (lengthening the reporting period).
195.
See id. at 29 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(i)) (allowing for reporting
directly to BLM or another database specified by the bureau in place of FracFocus); id. at 55
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(d)(5)) (eliminating the requirement operators provide
the estimated chemical composition of flowback water).
196.
See id. at 32 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3(j)) (summarizing the affidavit
procedure).
197.
See id. at 27–28 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(e)(4)) (requiring reporting
of inadequate cementing within 24 hours and certification that the job was corrected at least
72 hours before fracturing commences).
198.
See id. at 26–27 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(e)(2) (imposing the
requirement and listing permissible CELs).
199.
See id. at 25–26, 31 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 3162.3-3(d)–(e), 3162.33(i)(7)) (requiring operators to provide more detailed mapping of fracture direction and
propagation, conduct continuous monitoring of cementing and report within 30 days of the
end of fracturing operations, and include cementing monitoring and CELs in the certification
of wellbore integrity).
200.
See id. at 18, 49-50 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(b)) (allowing tribes to
designate water-bearing zones as exempt from any protective requirements that would
otherwise be imposed on operators).
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long as the variance is sufficiently protective to “meet or exceed the
effectiveness of the rule provision it replaces.”201
Although the proposed regulations would bring the federal rules up
to speed with their state counterparts, they pose a variety of potential
problems for tribes. For those tribes interested in development of their
energy resources, new and more stringent federal regulations raise the
danger of rendering oil and gas extraction in parts of Indian country
uneconomical through delays and increased costs.202 The extent to which
those delays will be significant is in dispute: BLM has asserted that
preapproval for hydraulic fracturing could be included in the existing
permitting process without a significant increase in processing time, 203
while tribal parties have projected that the regulations could delay approval
by several months at the busiest field offices.204 Probable costs are similarly
disputed: BLM estimates that implementation of the new rules would cost,
in the most expensive scenario, about $44 million annually, but could save
upwards of $50 million annually in remediation costs;205 while CERT posits
201.
Id. at 33.
202.
See, e.g., Groen testimony, supra note 176, at 3 (arguing that federal compliance
for extraction on Indian land already involves substantial obstacles, and that a new rule will
result in “additional and extraordinary delays” in the approval of tribal projects); Hall
testimony, supra note 3, at 9–10 (noting that approval of oil and gas permits on Indian land
may take up to twenty times longer than elsewhere and already involves substantial
environmental review, and that additional burdens will negatively impact tribal revenue);
Show testimony, supra note 176, at 4 (noting that permit applications on the Blackfeet
reservation may take up to eighteen months, and could be further delayed by the BLM
standards, which leave too much discretion to local officials and require too extensive
chemical disclosure to practically implement).
203.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 27695 (May 11, 2012) (“The BLM understands the time sensitive
nature of oil and gas drilling and well completion activities and does not anticipate that the
submittal of additional well stimulation-related information with APD applications will
impact the timing of the approval of drilling permits.”).
204.
See CERT comment, supra note 10, at 8–9, 13 (interpreting the proposed rule to
require preapproval of acid job stimulation, increasing the number of approvals required by
fifty percent, and producing an eight-month delay in the Vernal, Utah field office’s 484-day
turnaround time for Indian mineral approvals). CERT notes that delays could cost operators
upwards of $25 thousand per day in rental fees for rigs and drilling equipment. See id. at 10–
11 (noting that operators pay $25–30,000/day in rental fees even during delay downtime). It
is worth noting that in the revised rules, BLM concedes that “some delays may be
inevitable,” particularly at high-volume offices, but argues that the streamlining amendments
and the availability of remote assistance from other offices will limit such delays. Revised
rules, supra note 6, at 40.
205.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 27701, table 3 (May 11, 2012) (projecting a $44.18 million
annualized cost at a three percent discount rate and a high estimated number of well
stimulations, but a $50.27 million social benefit where environmental risk and remediation
costs are high). Most of the projected social benefit arises from the requirement that
operators line open storage pits, as social benefit drops by about $41 million in the
alternative scenario where no pit liners are required; but as BLM points out, the projection
does not account for certain benefits that are difficult to quantify, including the public

336

4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 305 (2013)

that these estimates overlook various annual compliance costs on operators
in Indian country, including $1.3 million paid to technicians to provide
detailed well designs and $41.2 million for longer casing to comply with
the usable water protection requirements, as well as the administrative costs
to BLM of application processing, and the costs to tribes from depressed
drilling demand and diminished royalties. 206 Review of regulatory
requirements for pre-fracturing approval will also impose administrative
costs on tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.207
Of more serious concern is the effect of more stringent regulations
on tribes interested in resource development. Under the original proposed
rule, as a precondition of permit approval, operators would have been
required to submit “[a] certification . . . that the proposed treatment fluid
complies with . . . all applicable Federal, tribal, state, and local laws, rules,
and regulations” to BLM.208 BLM purported to apply this regulation to all
wells it administers, “including those on Federal, tribal, and individual
Indian trust lands,”209 and initially expressed its intention to “implement on
public lands whichever rules, state or Federal, are most protective of
Federal lands and resources and the environment.” 210 Although this
language was susceptible to multiple interpretations, in the context of the
rest of the rule, it appeared that BLM intended to apply, for the sake of
benefits of chemical disclosure and “such benefits as avoiding harm to water users that
cannot be compensated by later providing alternative water sources.” Id. at 27700–02.
206.
See CERT comment, supra note 10, at 10–14 (discussing the various expected
costs resulting from the regulations, amounting to $48.9 million annually for operators on
Indian land alone). It appears likely that many of CERT’s cost estimates, while not
unfounded, are overly generous, anticipating costs that either are already incurred to comply
with other regulatory requirements or would be incurred by an operator following the
industry’s own best practices. See Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 2, supra note 152, 53 Fed.
Reg. 46,808 (requiring, since 1988, that casing and cementing be adequate “to protect and/or
isolate all usable water zones”); API, Guidance Document HF1, at 20–22 (establishing that
“sophisticated software should be used to design hydraulic fracture treatments prior to their
execution,” while pressure should be monitored for the duration of a stimulation and
mechanical integrity monitored during the life of a well); id. at 8–10 (noting that well logs
are “critical data gathering tools” and that cement bond logs are “the most common type of
cement evaluation tool that is used”); id. at 15 (noting that when a fracturing treatment is
designed, “[p]retreatment quality control and testing is carried out in order to ensure a highquality outcome”); API, Guidance Document HF2, at 7 (describing the various additives that
may be included in fracturing fluid, a “carefully formulated product” that service providers
must design and compose for specific purposes in each operation); id. at 17–18 (suggesting
that fracking fluids and flowback water be stored in “tanks or lined pits.”). This makes it
more likely that BLM is correct in its assertion that the new regulations will impose a cost of
about $11,833 per well, or 0.3% of the total cost of drilling, and therefore will be “unlikely
to have an effect on the investment decisions of firms . . . .” 77 Fed. Reg. 27702–03.
207.
See CERT comment, supra note 10, at 10–11 (discussing tribal and BIA review).
208.
77 Fed. Reg. 27710 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(c)(4)).
209.
Id. at 27693.
210.
Id. at 27694.
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uniformity, the most restrictive rule in a jurisdiction to a proposed well
under its management. 211 In certain contexts, this approach could be
beneficial: by incorporating tribal law and regulation into the federal permit
approval rules, it would ensure compliance with tribal rules, where they are
more restrictive than federal law; thus, when a tribe like the Turtle
Mountain Band decides to prohibit hydraulic fracturing entirely, the federal
rule would appear to operate to effectively apply the tribal regulation to
operations on federal and fee land, even if its independent applicability
would otherwise be in dispute.
The trouble would have arisen in the inverse scenario, where
federal or state law would be incorporated into federal permitting
requirements so as to impose more stringent effective requirements on tribal
or individual Indian land under federal management, thus placing a greater
burden on operators than tribes would on their own. BLM has, correctly,
mooted this concern by eliminating the offending certification language and
making clear that it does not intend to apply state or local laws to Indian
land.212 Because tribal sovereignty would typically prevent the operation of
state law and regulation regarding such matters on Indian land, 213 the
original language could have had a deleterious and undesirable effect on
tribal sovereignty, contrary to national policy.214 To the extent that policy
entails giving tribal governments a free hand to “make their own laws and
211.
See id. at 27692 (“The BLM proposes to apply the same rules and standards to
Indian lands so that these lands and communities receive the same level of protection
provided for public lands.”) Thus, although BLM clearly recognizes that Indian and public
lands are two separate categories, it nevertheless seemed to propose applying uniform
regulations to both. But see CERT comment, supra note 9, at 4 (arguing that because
FLPMA excludes Indian and Native Alaskan trust land from its definition of “public lands,”
BLM lacks all regulatory authority therein); Bureau of Land Management’s Hydraulic
Fracturing Rule’s Impacts on Indian Tribal Energy Development: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Indian and Alaska Native Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Scott
Russell, Secretary, Crow Tribe) (arguing that by imposing regulation, “BLM continues to
treat tribal lands like public land”); Bureau of Land Management’s Hydraulic Fracturing
Rule’s Impacts on Indian Tribal Energy Development: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Indian and Alaska Native Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of the Hon. Don Young,
Chairman) (“It is a rule that wrongly treats land held in trust for the exclusive use and benefit
of Indians as public land.”).
212.
See revised rules, supra note 6, at 25, 90–91 (creating separate certification clauses
for certification on federal and tribal land, and specifying that “the revision is to clarify that
this part does not apply State or local law to Indian lands.”).
213.
See supra notes 129–37 and accompanying text (discussing the jurisdictional
division between tribal and state governments).
214.
See COHEN, supra note 64, § 1.07, at 93–107 (discussing the trend of federal
policy since the late 1950s toward strengthening of the government-to-government
relationship with tribes and greater deference to tribal decisionmaking); Memorandum of
Nov. 5, 2009, Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (directing executive agencies to
collaborate and consult with tribes on federal policies affect tribes, in order to strengthen the
government-to-government relationship).
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be governed by them,” 215 application of state law to tribes would be
inconsistent with it; BLM was thus correct to heed commenters’ requests
for clarification, and reject the interpretation that would have allowed
imposition of state law through the certification requirement.216
But even with this correction, the revised rule risks creating a
competitive disadvantage for tribes. Even if state law is more stringent than
federal or tribal rules, tribes would remain subject to the more complicated
permitting regime surrounding federally-managed wells and Indian trust
land, limiting their ability to compete effectively.217 Alternatively, if federal
law is more stringent, states would enjoy a competitive advantage by
operation of law: the federal rules would not apply to land outside BLM's
asserted authority—“the public mineral estate (including split estate where
the Federal Government owns the subsurface mineral estate)” and Indian
land subjected to the federal rules—leaving only the relaxed state standards
to govern such land, and making it more attractive to developers than
Indian land.218 Although the former, rather than the latter, scenario appears
to be applicable to tribes in the Williston basin—the rules in Montana and
North Dakota apparently being more stringent than the federal regulations
on most points219—either situation risks predisposing operators to look to
private land, state land, or federal public land (i.e. federal jurisdiction
outside Indian country) before seeking to develop tribal or Indian trust
land.220
Although BLM’s revision has reduced the competitive
disadvantage by not subjecting tribes to both the cumbersome federal
permitting procedure and more stringent state law, tribes are still left with
the problem of cases where the federal rule is more restrictive than state
rules, which could be solved by suspending its operation on tribal or tribal
trust land, in which case BLM would defer to tribal regulation and/or allow
tribes to opt into the federal regulations. Yet BLM has—needlessly—
rejected this option as inconsistent with applicable law. 221 The bureau
points to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act’s authorization provision, which
subjects mineral leases on Indian land to “the rules and regulations
215.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
216.
See CERT comment, supra note 9, at 5–7 (calling on BLM to clarify its treatment
of its authority to implement state law on Indian land and its interpretation of whether state
law is “applicable” under the terms of the regulation).
217.
See CERT comment, supra note 10, at 8 (discussing current delays in federal
permitting on Indian land).
218.
77 Fed. Reg. 27,692 (May 11, 2012).
219.
See supra notes 179–91 (comparing the proposed federal rules with Montana and
North Dakota state regulation).
220.
See CERT comment, supra note 10, at 7 (discussing the economic factors leading
operators to look outside Indian country for development opportunities).
221.
See revised rules, supra note 6, at 17 (discussing commenter proposals for a tribal
exemption or an opt-out provision in the regulations).
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promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior.” 222 The bureau takes the
authorization to mean that, because Interior “has consistently interpreted
this statutory directive as allowing uniform regulations,” it would be
inconsistent with Interior procedures to create a tribal exemption.223
Leaving aside the initial problem that the Department’s permissive
authorization of uniform regulations is not the same as a mandate of such
regulations, there is nothing in the statutory language indicating that “the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior” must
treat tribal land identically to federal land.224 It makes more sense to read
this provision as merely placing Indian mineral leases under the
Department’s rulemaking authority in the broadest terms, particularly as the
line immediately following gives the Secretary full discretion to subject
Indian mineral leases to “any reasonable . . . plan approved or prescribed by
said Secretary” before the lease is issued.225 To the extent that the IMLA
was concerned with regulatory uniformity, its focus was correcting the
“haphazard” complex of legislation that had previously governed Indian
mineral leasing up to that point; it sought uniformity in the regulations
governing Indian mineral development, not all mineral development.226 The
IMLA was a response to the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act,
which was itself focused on expanding tribal sovereignty, and merely
authorized the Secretary to promulgate “rules and regulations under which
the [Indian mineral leasing] program would operate.”227
Given the weakness of BLM’s statutory basis for rejecting a tribal
exemption from the new rules, and the policy of tribal self-determination
that has only grown stronger in modern times, BLM should recognize that
federal regulation must yield to tribal policy on this question. Such an
approach would maintain the status quo of allowing tribes to resolve,
222.
Revised rules, supra note 6, at 17 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 396d (2012)).
223.
Revised rules, supra note 6, at 17 (emphasis added).
224.
25 U.S.C. § 396d (2012).
225.
Id. BLM cites no authority for its counterintuitive reading of the plain language of
the statute; and to the extent that courts have addressed the Department’s ability to delegate
authority to or create an exemption for tribes, their decisions provide only weak support, at
best, for BLM’s interpretation. See Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian
Reservation v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation of Montana, 792 F.2d 782, 795-96 (9th Cir.
1986) (questioning BLM’s delegation of authority to state agency, given statute’s silence on
subdelegation, but noting that delegations to tribes would differ because tribes have
independent jurisdiction, the statute’s purpose was increasing Indian leasing authority and
economic returns, and statutes are to be broadly construed in Indians’ favor); Kenai Oil &
Gas, Inc. v. Dep’t of Interior, 671 F.2d 383, (10th Cir. 1982) (noting that the Secretary’s
authority under § 396d is broadly construed but conditioned by the government’s trust
responsibility, which requires profitable management and imposes a duty to maximize
revenues).
226.
Peter F. Carroll, The Dawning of a New Era: Tribal Self-Determination in Indian
Mineral Production, 9 PUB. LAND L. REV. 81, 85–86 (1988).
227.
Id.
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through their own political processes, how they intend to treat hydraulic
fracturing on their land.228 It is those decisions—as well as potential and
proposed future options for tribes, tribal members, and reservation
residents—to which this note now turns.
V. Regulations and Remedies: Tribal and Individual Influence of Fracking
Up to this point, this note has primarily considered oil and gas
development or restriction thereof from the perspective of tribal
governments; however, given potentially localized effects of fracking
operations, 229 in some circumstances the priorities of tribal governments
may diverge from those of non-Indian reservation residents,230 as well as
individual tribal members.231 As such, it is necessary to consider not only
tribes’ approaches to regulating hydraulic fracturing, but also the remedies
available to affected individuals.
A number of factors—significantly, the historical primacy of the
federal government in managing Indian resources, and the lack of
institutional and regulatory capacity in tribal governments—have hindered
tribes’ abilities to comprehensively manage their natural resources and
administer regimes of environmental regulation. 232 In the area of the
Williston basin, a number of tribes have enacted general environmental
codes;233 of those tribes, the Three Affiliated Tribes at Fort Berthold and the
Fort Peck Tribes—where most development and hydraulic fracturing has
228.
See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (discussing the divergence of tribal
opinion on fracturing, from enthusiastic development to complete prohibition).
229.
See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 44, at 8173 (finding a correlation between proximity
to hydraulically fractured active gas wells and methane concentrations in drinking water).
230.
See COHEN, supra note 64, § 18.06, at 1185 (“[M]any non-Indians own fee land
within reservation boundaries . . . .”); cf. Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes of
Wind River Reservation, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982) (affirming partial summary
judgment in tribe’s favor where it sued to enjoin non-Indian fee landowners’ development of
property, contrary to tribal zoning ordinance).
231.
Cf. Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Klein, 439 Fed. App’x. 679 (10th
Cir. 2011) (dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, Navajo nonprofit’s challenge of Interior
agency’s issuance of permit to company who leased mine from Navajo Nation).
232.
See MAURA GROGAN, NATIVE AMERICAN LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT 42–46 (2011) (discussing tribal challenges in shifting away from federal
resource management in the self-determination era); THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN
INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS 165 [hereinafter
HARVARD PROJECT] (discussing concerns that tribes “lack the institutional and enforcement
mechanisms” and the human capital to properly deal with energy developers); id. at 184–87
(surveying tribal experience with environmental regulation and their efforts to build
institutional capacity).
233.
See Fort Peck Tribes Comprehensive Code of Justice, Title XXII [hereinafter
CCOJ] (“Protection of the Environment”); Standing Rock Sioux Code, Title 29
(“Environmental Code”); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation Tribal
Code, Title 15 (“Environmental Code”).
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been concentrated—have adopted regulations for oil and gas development,
with implications for hydraulic fracturing.234
The explosion in exploration and extraction on the Fort Berthold
reservation and in the surrounding area made a legislative response by the
tribe urgently necessary.235 The reservation’s size and location has meant
that, unlike the state of North Dakota, resource development (and the
negative externalities associated with boomtowns and inadequate
infrastructure) has ubiquitous effects throughout the jurisdiction.236 Those
effects, in turn, can present acute difficulties because the Three Affiliated
Tribes have—as do practically all other Native groups—unique legal ties,
as well as social and cultural ones, to their reservation as a homeland.237
Because of those unique circumstances, the tribe began taking a more active
role in regional oil and gas development, entering into development
agreements on more favorable terms with operators, engaging in its own
operations, and seeking to construct its own refinery on the reservation.238
In 2010, the tribe settled a longstanding dispute with the state over taxation
of oil and gas production on the reservation, entering into a permanent
agreement that settled applicable tax rates and division of revenues.239 The
agreement provided for an equal division of revenues from production on
tribal trust lands, diversion of twenty percent of state taxes on non-trust
reservation lands to the tribe, and a tribal assessment of $100,000 in fees for
each new well drilled on trust land.240
234.
See CCOJ Title XXII, Ch. 2 (“Underground Injection Control”); Three Affiliated
Tribes Tribal Code tit. 15, ch. 15.1 (“Solid and Hazardous Waste Management and
Remediation Code”).
235.
See Raymond Cross, Development’s Victim or its Beneficiary?: The Impact of Oil
and Gas Development on the Fort Berthold Reservation, 87 N.D. L. REV. (2011) 535, 537–
38 (noting that the new hydraulic fracking and horizontal drilling technologies, in opening
the Bakken formation to drilling, placed the Fort Berthold reservation at the center of the
largest oil reserve in the continental United States).
236.
See id. at 538–43 (comparing North Dakota’s development approach of providing
encouragement to developers and funding for improved infrastructure to Fort Berthold,
where small land area results in a “disproportionate environmental burden” on a vulnerable
population). But see Hall testimony, supra note 3, at 8–9 (noting that although the tribe
“cannot just pick up and move to another reservation if our lands or waters are spoiled,”
energy development has improved reservation conditions and the tribal economy).
237.
See Cross, supra note 235, at 543–46 (discussing the tribes’ treaty ties to Fort
Berthold, legally a central aspect of tribal sovereignty, and the land’s distinctive connection
to tribal culture and religion); HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 232, at 106–07 (“Land holds a
special significance to Native nations that . . . goes far beyond the need to provide areas for
tribal housing, community institutions, and business ventures.”).
238.
See Cross, supra note 235, at 552 (describing the tribe’s shifting position).
239.
See James MacPherson, North Dakota, Three Affiliated Tribes Garner Millions of
Dollars From Oil Tax Accord, MINNEAPOLIS STAR–TRIBUNE, Jan. 15, 2010 (discussing the
agreement, which made indefinite a prior temporary accord with the state).
240.
See Oil and Gas Tax Agreement Between The Three Affiliated Tribes And State
of
North
Dakota
§§
D–F
(Jan.
13,
2010),
available
at
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Yet oil and gas development also resulted in the improper disposal
and discharge on the reservation of wastes associated with drilling and
exploration, for which the tribe had established no regulations as late as
2011. 241 In response, the tribe adopted interim regulations in July 2011
“governing the disposal of waste associated with the exploration and
production of oil and gas on the Fort Berthold Reservation.”242 The tribe
based its authority for the regulations on its inherent power, recognized in
Montana v. United States.243
Under the interim regulations, the tribe prohibited disposal of waste
“associated with the exploration or production of oil and gas on any lands”
within the reservation boundaries, except at an “authorized facility,” so
defined to require prior approval by the tribal council of the facility for
disposal.244 The regulations took a broad view of the kinds of activities that
could constitute “disposal” and were thus subject to the regulation,
including any “discharge”—accidental or intentional “spilling, leaking,
pumping . . . [and] injecting”—as well as any deposit or placement “into or
on any soil, air or water.”245 Concurrent enforcement authority was given to
six tribal agencies: the Energy Department, Environmental Department,
Game and Fish Department, Tribal Employment Rights Office (TERO),
Fire Management Department, and tribal law enforcement.246 The TERO
was given additional authority to audit the records of companies conducting
oilfield waste disposal operations in order to ensure compliance with the
rules.247 The tribal court was given jurisdiction over complaints and appeals
http://www.nd.gov/tax/oilgas/threeatribes/pubs/oilgastaxagreement.pdf?201303151452 23
(memorializing the state-tribal agreement).
241.
See Tribal Bus. Council Res. 11-75-VJB, at 1 (2011) (noting that companies
engaged in oil production on the reservation have begun improperly disposing of wastes, for
which the tribe had no legal framework in place prior to the resolution’s passage on July 14).
242.
Id.
243.
See id. at 2 (reciting the Montana standard).
244.
Id. at 2–3.
245.
Id. at 2. The interim rule, though evidently broad, was not consistent in its
terminology, as the definition for “discharge” and the prohibition clause referred to “waste,”
and the definition for “disposal” referred specifically to “solid or hazardous waste,” whereas
the interim regulation defined “hazardous substance” (not hazardous waste) as any
substance, the improper management of which “may pose a substantial present or future
hazard to human health or the environment . . . .” Id. at 2–3. This discrepancy was probably
more formal than functional for present purposes, as the undesirable byproducts of hydraulic
fracturing would probably qualify under any of the applicable terminology. Cf. supra note
41 (discussing various hazardous substances commonly found in fracturing fluid); supra
note 111 (discussing the definition of “hazardous substance” in the Montana rules on oil and
gas production).
246.
See id. at 3 (providing “joint responsibility” for enforcement to the six agencies).
247.
See id. (providing for 24 hours’ notice prior to a compliance audit, except in cases
where the tribe was notified of a willful violation, in which case the audit is to be conducted
immediately).
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from citations.248
The interim regulation also provided substantial civil penalties for
violations, categorized based on whether they were willful or merely
negligent.249 Negligent violations were subject to a $5,000 fine for the first
offense, which doubled for the second violation and increased to $50,000
for each offense thereafter.250 Willful violations are treated more severely,
with a $10,000 fine levied for the first offense, which increases to $25,000
for the second offense and $1,000,000 for each willful offense thereafter.251
Violators are also made liable for the costs of remediation needed to
prevent environmental damage or risk to public health. 252 Repeated
violations, failure to pay a fine, or failure to fulfill a remediation obligation
is made grounds for suspension or revocation of an individual or company’s
TERO license.253
Many of these requirements were ultimately incorporated into the
permanent version of the tribe’s Solid and Hazardous Waste Management
and Remediation Code, which went into effect in October 2011. 254
Although the permanent chapter has a much broader scope than the interim
regulations, it was enacted in large part with oil and gas development in
mind, the Tribal Council recognizing the “increasing volume and variety of
solid and hazardous waste being generated on the reservation” and the need
for appropriate “utilization of natural resources of oil and gas . . . while
minimizing any adverse impacts to public health or the environment.”255
The regulations adopt substantially the same definitions for
approved disposal sites, “discharge,” and “disposal” as in the interim
regulations. 256 However, they create a much clearer status for the
byproducts of hydraulic fracturing, and oil and gas production generally, by
placing most of these under the specified category of “industrial wastes.”257
248.
See id. (establishing tribal court jurisdiction).
249.
See id. (establishing the schedule of fines).
250.
See id. (establishing the schedule of fines).
251.
See id. (establishing the schedule of fines).
252.
See id. at 4 (imposing the remediation requirement).
253.
See id. at 4 (authorizing suspension or revocation of the TERO license). A TERO
license, under which employers are required to offer employment or contracting preference
to tribal members, is mandatory under tribal law to conduct business on the reservation. See
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, Mandan Hidatsa and Arikara
Nation Indian Employment Rights and Contract Preference Ordinance, Titles II, VII,
available
at
http://mhatero.com/attachment/cms/AXT_3_IL6J.pdf
(outlining
the
employment preference and providing for fines or denial of rights to conduct business for
noncompliance).
254.
See Three Affiliated Tribes Tribal Code tit. 15, ch. 15.1, at 1 (stating that the
chapter was passed by the Tribal Business Council on Oct. 20, 2011).
255.
Id. §§ 1.04.2–1.04.3.
256.
See id. § 2.01 (defining terms).
257.
See id. § 8.02.14 (classifying “[o]il and gas exploration and production wastes, to
include petroleum or crude-oil contaminated soils” as industrial waste, and thereby subject
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Industrial waste may not be stored or disposed of within the reservation
boundaries except at a facility specifically authorized and permitted by the
Environmental Division (ED).258
The terms of the rules are sufficiently broad to encompass
fracturing fluid and flowback water in the scope of their regulation.259 The
rules would also capture any storage of fracturing fluid or flowback water
in a surface pit or tank and treat such storage as solid waste management.260
This would appear to mean that, as a general matter, such storage would be
subject to the permitting requirements for solid waste management
facilities;261 however, the rules make specific provision for permits for oil
and gas waste “accumulated, stored, or treated at the point of generation.”262
Such facilities are governed by the regulations’ requirements for permits by
rule, instead of the general permitting requirements.263
Under those requirements, operators must give the ED ten days’
notice before beginning to generate waste, are limited to 180 days of waste
management, and must conduct accumulation and storage in such a way as

to specific compliance requirements). Hydrogen sulfide releases from production facilities
are also treated as industrial waste. See id. § 8.02.16 (classifying hydrogen sulfide releases).
“Industrial waste” is itself defined to include “residues or spills of any industrial or
manufacturing process and waste resulting from . . . petroleum refining; oil and gas
exploration and extraction; [and] other mineral extraction . . . .” See id. § 2.01 (defining
“industrial waste”).
258.
See id. § 8.02 (discussing generally the management of special and industrial
wastes). For the purposes of this discussion, and because the rules’ treatment of oil and gas
waste appears to so indicate, oil and gas waste is presumed not to be a “hazardous
substance,” in which case disposal within the reservation boundaries would be totally
prohibited. See id. § 6.02 (enacting the prohibition); id. § 2.01 (defining “hazardous
substance” by reference to the designations in CERCLA, the Clean Water Act, the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, the Clean Air Act, or an EPA Administrator designation pursuant to the
Toxic Substances Control Act).
259.
See id. § 2.01 (defining “solid waste” to include “liquid . . . resulting from
industrial, commercial, mining, oil and gas development and production”).
260.
See id. (defining “storage” broadly to include any “confining, containing, [or]
holding . . . of solid waste for a limited period of time prior to” treatment or ultimate
disposal); id. (defining “surface impoundment” to include liquid-bearing depressions used
for containment or disposal, including holding, storage, settling, and aeration pits, ponds,
and lagoons.”); id. (defining “facility” to mean land, structures, and improvements involved
in solid waste management, including surface impoundments).
261.
See id. § 13.01(b) (requiring a general permit for solid waste disposal, collection,
or transfer); id. § 14.05 (outlining the application requirements for management facilities at
which solid waste is to be stored, collected, treated, or otherwise managed).
262.
Id. § 13.03.7.
263.
See id. § 8.02.14 (providing that oil and gas waste is to be treated as industrial
waste and subject to compliance with Section 13’s permit-by-rule requirements); id. § 13.03
(providing that permits by rule entail permission constructively issued without formal
application, so long as the operator gives the ED timely notice, pays applicable fees, and
remains in compliance with applicable rules).
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to create no public nuisance or hazard. 264 Public access to the waste
management units must be controlled, but the Environment Division
director or a designee must be able to access the units at all times, and a
sign must be posted identifying the date accumulation began. 265 Perhaps
most significant, the rules require that the waste management unit be
“bermed, lined and covered with an impermeable material which has a
nominal thickness of 6 millimeters, at a minimum,” and must also be
covered if runoff from the unit is not controlled or a complaint about the
unit’s odor has been made.266 The length of time during which a permit by
rule shall be valid is left to the discretion of the Environment Division.267
Permits by rule may be modified or suspended by the ED Director, based
on the terms of the permit, and are subject to review and public comment at
any time.268 Permitees by rule are required to submit any permits or leases
issued for operation of the facility, as well as documentation that these
fulfill other tribal licensing requirements and that applicable fees have been
paid, as well as any other forms or fees required by the ED.269
Presumably, waste that is not stored at the generation site is subject
to the general requirements for waste management facilities.270 These rules
are somewhat more rigorous than for permits by rule, as prior application
and approval pursuant to Section 14 is required.271 Applicants must provide
a description of the facilities and equipment to be used for storage, an
evaluation of the geology and hydrology of the site, a statement of land uses
on adjoining property, procedures in place to avoid leaks and spills, a
description of programs used to train employees in proper management,
plans for closure and post-closure maintenance of the facility, and other
information deemed “necessary” by the ED or Natural Resources
Committee.272 These permits may be valid for up to five years.273
Both permits by rule and solid waste management facility permits
depend on the ED’s determination that “primary consideration is given to
preventing environmental damage or health threats” and that long-term
protection thereof has been the “guiding criterion.” 274 To achieve these
264.
See id. § 13.03.7–13.03.7.1 (outlining the requirements).
265.
See id. § 13.03.7.2–13.03.7.3, 13.03.7.5 (outlining the requirements).
266.
Id. § 13.04.7.4.
267.
See id. § 15.03.3 (“Permit-by-Rule may be issued for a range of time periods to be
determined by the TAT ED”).
268.
See id. § 15.21 (providing regulations specific to permits by rule).
269.
See id. § 14.03 (outlining the permit application requirements).
270.
See supra notes 259–62 and accompanying text (analyzing the general
requirements and the carve-out for onsite storage).
271.
See Three Affiliated Tribes Tribal Code tit. 15, ch. 15.1, § 13.01 (requiring permits
for solid waste collection facilities, to be obtained by application pursuant to Section 14).
272.
See id. § 14.05 (outlining the permit application requirements).
273.
See id. § 15.03.1 (stating length of permit validity).
274.
Id. §15.01.
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purposes, the Director is authorized to prohibit or place conditions on
further waste handling, for the sake of environmental quality; to require
compliance by the applicant facility; and to place conditions on the permit,
including the implementation of mitigation measures and contingency plans
to minimize damage from waste handling.275 The Director or a designee is
entitled to inspect “any permitted premises” during regular operating hours
or upon two hours’ notice. 276 The rules expressly authorize denial of a
permit in cases where the proposed method of waste handling poses a
hazard to the environment, public health, or welfare or natural resources of
the tribe; or where the applicant reasonably appears unlikely to comply with
the tribal regulations, as because of a history of noncompliance with tribal
or analogous state/federal regulations.277
If there is a violation, the Director is authorized to take informal
action (if the violation does not pose an imminent risk and is nonrepetitive); to issue a notice of violation summarizing the compliance
issues, schedule of compliance, and potential penalties; and, if
noncompliance continues, to issue orders to submit to fines or penalties, to
cease and desist construction or operation, or to take remedial action. 278
Failure to comply with an administrative order and remedy a violation is
declared grounds for suspension, modification, or revocation of a permit.279
The Tribal Court is also authorized to issue injunctions and other relief as
needed to secure compliance.280
Like the interim regulations, the permanent code also provides for
civil penalties and liabilities, albeit with some alterations from the interim
form.281 The permanent regulations authorize the Director to impose civil
penalties for unauthorized handling/disposal of waste on the reservation,
noncompliant waste facilities, or violation of a statutory or administrative
regulation. 282 Fines are assessed at a maximum rate of $25,000 per
violation, per day that the violation continues, up to a per-incident
maximum of $500,000 for negligent violations and $1,000,000 for willful

275.
See id. § 15.01.1–15.01.5 (outlining the Director’s permitting authority).
276.
See id. § 15.07 (establishing this authority).
277.
See id. § 15.11 et seq. (stating grounds for permit denial).
278.
See id. § 17.04 et seq. (authorizing enforcement actions).
279.
See id. § 17.08 (authorizing the Director to take such action).
280.
See id. § 18.04 (establishing Tribal Court jurisdiction and authorization).
281.
Compare Tribal Bus. Council Res. 11-75-VJB, at 3 (providing distinct schedules
of fines for negligent and willful violations) with Three Affiliated Tribes Tribal Code tit. 15,
ch. 15.1, § 18.01.1.1 (providing a single schedule of fines, but different penalty caps for
negligent and willful violations).
282.
See Three Affiliated Tribes Tribal Code tit. 15, ch. 15.1, § 18.01.1 (stating grounds
for civil penalties).
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violations.283 A person may also be required to perform between eight and
200 hours of community service for a violation. 284 Notwithstanding
imposition of administrative penalties, a violator may be liable for civil
damages, if applicable; and may lose the right, temporarily or permanently,
to continue engaging in activity on the reservation.285 An operator may be
required to perform mediation or to reimburse the tribe for the cost of
remediation, if remediation is found to be necessary. 286 Finally, the
regulations impose a notice requirement on operators if the release meets
specified conditions.287
Admittedly, it cannot be seriously argued that these regulations are
as rigorous as those present in the proposed federal fracking rules; they do
not even begin to address substantive drilling requirements, such as those
for wellbore integrity, or mandatory disclosure of chemicals used in the
stimulation and extraction process. 288 In that sense, the rules take a
conservative approach, and may not go as far as they should in the view of
some observers.289 Nevertheless, it rightly falls to tribes as a matter of selfdetermination to decide the extent to which the industry is to be regulated,
just as it falls to tribes to determine the extent to which each tribe will
pursue mineral development at all.290 And as the prior assessment of the
Three Affiliated Tribes’ regulations demonstrates, tribes may reasonably
choose to take a restrained approach while nevertheless enacting
substantive restrictions on extractive industries, even if those restrictions
are modest but credible back-end incentives to discourage environmentally
283.
See id. § 18.01.1.1 (stating the schedule of fines, assessment of which requires the
concurrence of the tribal Public Safety Commissioner, tribal CEO, Tribal Council, or Tribal
Court).
284.
See id. § 18.01.1.2 (establishing this as an alternative to monetary penalty).
285.
See id. §§ 18.01.1.4–18.01.1.5 (imposing liability for civil damages and potential
forfeit of rights to enter or conduct activity on the reservation).
286.
See id. § 19.07 (authorizing required mediation and establishing reimbursement
liability).
287.
See id. § 19.13 et seq. (requiring notification of the tribal response program if a
pollutant, contaminant, or hazardous substance is released that threatens health or the
environment, is greater than 25 gallons, exceeds tribal or EPA water quality standards, is
required by the Superfund amendments, or is otherwise required by the Director).
288.
See supra notes 151–91 and accompanying text (making such provision in the
current and proposed federal regulations).
289.
See Cross, supra note 235, at 569 (arguing, in consideration of the interim
regulations, that “the tribe may have to take further and more substantial regulatory steps if it
wants to ensure that development is regulated in a legally and socially responsible manner . .
.”).
290.
See Grogan, supra note 232, at 43 (“This is what tribal self-determination means:
the power of individual Indian nations to make meaningful decisions that reflect their own
priorities and values, and their own calculations about what best serves their long-term
interests. Under conditions of self-determination, different nations may make different
strategic choices.”).
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irresponsible behavior.291
The tribes at Fort Peck have similarly attempted to exercise some
control over energy extraction on their reservation, but by assuming
responsibility for underground injection control within their jurisdiction.292
Briefly described, the Underground Injection Control Program was
implemented in order to require states—or, in the absence of state primacy,
the EPA Administrator—to promulgate permitting regulations for all
underground injection wells, in order to “prevent underground injection
which endangers drinking water sources . . . .”293 The federal rules establish
six categories of injection well, with Class II wells covering hydraulic
fracturing for oil and gas extraction. 294 Congress added the option for
Indian tribes to attain enforcement primacy in 1986,295 and the Fort Peck
tribes took over primacy for Class II wells on Nov. 26, 2008.296 However,
since 2005, hydraulic fracturing using fluids or proppants other than diesel
fuels has been excluded from the scope of the UIC program.297 This has
meant that, at least within the context of hydraulic fracturing, the impact of
the UIC program has been significantly curtailed.298 It remains significant
in the context of the Fort Peck reservation, however, which as of 2011 had
29 Class II wells within the reservation boundaries.299
291.
See supra notes 254–87 and accompanying text (outlining the tribal regulations).
292.
See 40 C.F.R. § 147.3200 (establishing that the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes at
Fort Peck have assumed responsibility for administration of Class II wells within the
reservation boundaries).
293.
42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1). See also 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(c) (providing for EPA
regulation in the absence of state primacy).
294.
See 40 C.F.R. § 144.6 (establishing the six classifications); id. § 144.6(b)(2)
(“Class II. Wells which inject fluids . . . [f]or enhanced recovery of oil and natural gas”).
295.
See Pub. L. No. 99-339, § 302(c), 100 Stat. 653, 666 (1986) (adding provision for
primary enforcement responsibility by Indian tribes).
296.
See 40 C.F.R. § 147.3200 (providing the effective date for the Assiniboine and
Sioux program).
297.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(d) (defining underground injection as excluding “the
underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to
hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities.”);
Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 199 Stat. 694 (2005) (amending statute to include the current
language).
298.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 27,453 (May 20, 2012) (“[A] review of data available [through
FracFocus] suggested that approximately 2% of wells that hydraulically fracture would be
subject to SDWA UIC permitting requirements in states where EPA administers the UIC
program.”).
299.
See EPA, UIC Inventory by Tribe—2011, at 3, available at
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/upload/uicinventorybytribe2011.pdf (providing a
list of tribes and the number of each class of well at each reservation). By way of
comparison, Fort Berthold had only three Class II wells in 2011. See id. at 3 (listing tribes
and well numbers). A search of FracFocus reveals only four wells in the database where
fracking is known to have occurred, three of which used petroleum distillates in their
fracking operations. See http://www.fracfocusdata.org/fracfocusfind/Map.aspx (providing
access to information on API well numbers 25085218640000, 25085218210000,
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The federal regulations impose fairly rigorous minimum standards
for state regulations on permitting and conditions for operation. Permitting
requires demonstration that casing and cementing is adequate for fluid
containment, usually with a cement bond long; plans for plugging and
abandonment, and a surety to guarantee completion; limitation on operating
pressure, to ensure that no fluid enters drinking water supplies; mandatory
monitoring and reporting; and mandatory mechanical integrity tests at least
once every five years, failure of which triggers shutdown of operations.300
For Class II wells specifically, a mechanical integrity test is required after
every workover.301 Injection pressure is not permitted to exceed “that which
would initiate and/or propagate fractures in the confining zone adjacent to”
a drinking water source.302 Operators are required to test injection fluid to
ensure compliance with permit parameters; to observe injection pressure,
flow rate, and cumulative volume at least once monthly for enhanced
recovery wells; and to submit an annual report of these observations.303 A
number of other reporting requirements are also imposed, including
reporting before integrity tests, after workovers or temporary
abandonments, before changes in ownership, and before plugging and
abandonment.304
The Assiniboine and Sioux, in creating their own set of UIC
regulations, have adopted many of the federal regulatory standards
wholesale, by reference, but also included a number of original provisions,
particularly for civil penalties and hearing procedures.305 The regulations
prohibit any underground injection or construction of a new well without a
permit from the Fort Peck Office of Environmental Protection; in this way,
they differ from the federal regulations, which would permit injection wells
authorized by rule, without a new permit.306 The tribes have also prohibited
outright the operation of any Class I, III, or IV wells, which would include
any wells injecting hazardous substances or nonhydrocarbon minerals

25085218140000, and 25091219140000) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
300.
See EPA, Technical Program Overview: Underground Injection Control
Regulations, at 65–66 (2001) (summarizing the regulatory requirements common to Class, I,
II, and III wells).
301.
See id. at 69 (discussing specifically Class II regulations).
302.
Id.
303.
See id. at 70 (discussing specifically Class II regulations).
304.
See id. at 70 (discussing the reporting requirements for Class II wells).
305.
See generally CCOJ, tit. XXII, ch. 2, §§ 200–81 (establishing the tribe’s UIC
regulations).
306.
Compare CCOJ, tit. XXII, §§ 201, 211(c) (stating that injection wells without a
permit are prohibited, and refusing to permit authorization by rule) with 40 C.F.R. §§
144.22, 144.31(c)(1) (authorizing existing Class II permits by rule for the life of the well,
and requiring applications within four years of promulgation of a UIC program).
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mining.307
The tribal regulations adopt many of the federal general provisions
by reference, including well classifications, provisions for confidentiality of
submitted information, modes of identifying and exempting underground
sources of drinking water, noncompliance reporting requirements, and
prohibitions regarding Class II wells on the movement of fluid into drinking
water sources. 308 Likewise, they adopt most of the federal permitting
regulations, including those on area and emergency permits, permit
duration and compliance effects, continuation, transfer, permit conditions,
monitoring requirements, and corrective action. 309 The tribal regulations,
however, set original requirements for operator requirements, monitoring,
and notices. Permit applicants are required to include a surety bond, to
report all owners of surface and mineral rights and operators of injection
wells within ¼ mile of the applicant’s well, and to perform a cement bond
log if the well is a converted production well.310 The tribal rules further
require approval by the Office of Environmental Policy (OEP) Director
before a permit may be transferred, performance of a cement bond long as a
permit condition, and 24 hours’ notice prior to the OEP before corrective
action is taken.311 Most notably, more stringent monitoring requirements are
imposed: the rules require monitoring of injected fluids at least annually, as
well as on any occasion where the source changes or the operator believes
quality may have changed; recording of every observance of injection
pressure, flow rate, and volume; and a daily record of volume, hours in
service, maximum pressure, average pressure, and annulus pressure for
produced fluid operations. 312 The tribal rules substantially assume the
federal provisions for permit procedures, public comment, issuance, and
state compliance evaluation programs.313
In regard to substantive technical requirements, the tribal rules
adopt the federal technical criteria for Class II wells required of state
enforcement programs, including those for exempted aquifers, mechanical
integrity, plugging and abandonment, construction, operation, and
monitoring. 314 But the tribe has also imposed additional substantive
requirements of its own.315 Operators are required to maintain gauges of
307.
See CCOJ, tit. XXII, § 204 (defining the well classes); § 211 (“Any underground
injection into a Class I, III, or IV well is prohibited.”).
308.
See id. § 211(b) (adopting the CFR provisions on these points).
309.
See id. § 221(b) (adopting the CFR provisions on these points).
310.
See id. § 221(a) (imposing variations from the adopted federal regulations).
311.
See id. § 221(b)(7), (8), (14) (imposing the requirements).
312.
See id. § 221(b)(11) (imposing the requirements).
313.
See id. §§ 231, 250 (adopting the CFR provisions on these points).
314.
See id. § 241 (adopting the CFR provisions on these points). See also supra notes
176–79 and accompanying text (summarizing the federal provisions).
315.
See id. § 242 (“Additional Requirements”).
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tubing and annulus pressure, and to notify the OEP whenever a well loses
integrity or 24 hours before a workover.316 Operators are also prohibited
from commencing injection at any well until the OEP has approved of the
submitted cement bond log. 317 Finally, annual inspections of temporarily
abandoned wells are required, along with the requirement that owners and
operators make a satisfactory showing that the well complies with the
requirements for active wells and does not pose a risk to drinking water
sources.318
In contrast to the other regulations, the tribe’s enforcement
provisions are almost entirely original, rather than incorporated by
reference from the federal regulations with modification. 319 When a
violation is discovered, the OEP may seek to obtain voluntary compliance
through any appropriate means available.320 The OEP is entitled to issue
either a notice of the violation and a schedule of compliance requirements,
or an administrative order imposing penalties and/or compliance
requirements, subject to the opportunity for a hearing on the proposed order
at which the alleged violator may contest the allegation or contents of the
order. 321 The OEP is also authorized to subpoena alleged violators
regarding the violation, or to seek criminal penalties or other judicial relief;
and to seek civil penalties as an alternative to administrative order.322 The
Tribal Court is given authority, on application of the OEP, to compel
compliance with a subpoena or testimony order, order payment of civil and
administrative penalties, restrain or enjoin violations or behavior that
endangers the environment or public health, and order compliance with a
permit condition or well closure.323
Like the Three Affiliated Tribes’ regulations, the Assiniboine and
Sioux regulations entail substantial monetary penalties for violations of the
injection requirements. Administrative penalties are to be assessed based on
the seriousness of a violation, resulting economic benefits accruing to the
operator, the operator’s compliance history, good-faith efforts to comply,
economic impact of the penalty, and “such other matters as justice may
require.”324 Assessments must be between $1,000 and $5,000 per day of
violation, with a maximum cumulative penalty of “$125,000 for all
316.
See id. § 242(a)–(b) (imposing the requirements).
317.
See id. § 242(d) (imposing the requirement).
318.
See id. § 242(c) (imposing the requirement).
319.
See generally id. § 250–60 (establishing provisions for administrative
enforcement, civil and criminal penalties, judicial relief, and appeals).
320.
See id. § 251(h) (noting that OEP enforcement authority does not exclude option
of soliciting voluntary compliance).
321.
See id. § 251(a)–(d) (outlining OEP authority in regard to violations).
322.
See id. § 251(f) (outlining courses of action in addition to or as alternatives from
an administrative order).
323.
See id. §§ 251(g), 255(a) (outlining Tribal Court authority).
324.
Id. § 252(b).
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violations.”325 Civil penalties may result from failure to comply with permit
conditions or well regulations, and may be assessed at a rate between
$1,000 and $25,000 per violation, per day.326 Non-Indian violators may be
precluded from conducting business on the reservation, at the OEP’s
discretion.327 Yet the rule goes beyond monetary penalties, declaring each
day of violation by an Indian violator to be a Class A misdemeanor, thus
punishable by a maximum $500 fine or three months’ imprisonment, and
authorizes the OEP to refer violations by non-Indian violators to the EPA
for appropriate criminal enforcement.328
Although the applicability of these rules in the context of hydraulic
fracturing is necessarily limited in scope by the jurisdictional limitations of
the SDWA,329 they nevertheless demonstrate the fact that tribes can make
and execute regulatory determinations to the extent they consider
necessary. 330 But notwithstanding the importance of tribal regulation and
policy judgments about how to treat and deal with energy resource
development, tribal oversight may not be enough: tribal jurisdiction only
extends so far, and where tribal government priorities are inconsistent with
those of states or reservation residents, it may be necessary to look to other
sources of protection.
For individuals, the obvious (and perhaps only) mode of recourse
other than government regulation is judicial remedy; yet so far, the claims
of plaintiffs who have alleged environmental damage from hydraulic
fracturing operations have had a dismal track record, principally because of
the difficulty of proving causation. 331 To the extent that cases have
325.
Id. § 252(a).
326.
See id. § 253(a) (“[Compliance failure authorizes] civil penalties of at least $1,000
but not more than $25,000 per day. The maximum civil penalty shall be assessable for each
instance of violation and if the violation is continuous, shall be assessable up to the
maximum for each day of violation.”).
327.
See id. § 253(b) (authorizing the OEP to set a period of time during which the nonIndian violator’s privilege of conducting business on the reservation is suspended).
328.
See id. § 254(a)–(b) (outlining criminal penalties for Indian and non-Indian
violators); CCOJ tit. VII, § 501(2) (establishing the penalty for a Class A misdemeanor). As
a general matter, tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and have jurisdiction
over member and nonmember Indians only to the extent not limited by federal law. See
COHEN, supra note 64, § 9.04, at 765–69 (discussing jurisprudential limitations on tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and federal statutory schemes creating federal
jurisdiction for crimes involving only Indian parties); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7), 1302(b)
(limiting tribes’ authority to impose fines and terms of imprisonment in criminal cases).
329.
See supra note 293 and accompanying text (excluding hydraulic fracturing not
involving diesel fuels).
330.
See Grogan, supra note 232, at 45–46 (arguing that tribes must build their own
management capacities and that “the best way for the government to honor its trust
obligations is to stop trying to determine what is in the best interest of tribes and instead
support tribal efforts to make that decision autonomously.”).
331.
See King et al., supra note 26, at 344 (“To date, not one landowner’s claim has
succeeded, and at least two cases were voluntarily dismissed when the plaintiffs realized
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concerned the stimulation and extraction operation itself, rather than a
collateral part of the development process or legal issue,332 they have most
typically relied on either common-law causes of action in tort, breaches of
contract, or fraud.333 Courts have left open the possibility that, at least as a
matter of law, fracturing itself could constitute a nuisance or trespass, with
at least one court determining that the related activity of underground
wastewater injection can constitute a nuisance by creating solely subsurface
pollution. 334 Courts have also refused, when hydraulic fracturing
specifically is at issue, to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims when they brought strict
liability, medical monitoring, and nuisance claims against an operator
whose allegedly faulty well casing resulted in pollution.335 A plaintiff may
also have a viable cause of action for breach of contract, if the plaintiff has
a surface or mineral estate lease with the defendant that includes covenants
on water quality testing or condition of the land; or fraud, if a plaintiff can
establish harm from “justifiable reliance on a misrepresentation or
omission” regarding the risks of fracturing.336
Despite these as-yet hypothetical modes of recovery, no hydraulic
fracturing case has been decided in a plaintiff’s favor, and hence, there has
been no finding of causality between hydraulic fracturing and an alleged
harm; those cases that are not still ongoing have either been dismissed or

they could not produce any evidence of causation.”). It should be noted that, despite the
extensive development of oil and gas in Montana and North Dakota, and despite both states’
provision of specific statutory causes of action to certain landowners in the vicinity of
production wells, no reported cases have been found regarding hydraulic fracturing and
landowner damages. See also Dave Neslin, Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation: Recent
Developments and Current Issues in Cases Involving Alleged Water Supply Impacts, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, THE WATER–ENERGY NEXUS: ACQUISITION, USE,
AND DISPOSAL OF WATER FOR ENERGY AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT, at 4 (locating, in the
three years before Sept. 2012, thirty-five cases in nine states regarding landowner allegations
of damage due to hydraulic fracturing, but none in North Dakota or Montana) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
332.
See Neslin, supra note 331, at 11–15 (discussing unsuccessful cases that have
hinged on the parties’ ability to obtain treatment as a class, inadequacy of environmental
review under NEPA or a state equivalent, or claims based on local ordinances that were
preempted by statewide frameworks).
333.
See Neslin, supra note 331, at 4–8 (discussing the various approaches to claims).
334.
See Wiseman, supra note 18, at 9 (discussing the Texas case FPL Farming v.
Environmental Processing, in which this was held).
335.
See Wiseman, supra note 18, at 10 (discussing Pennsylvania case Berish v.
Southwestern Energy, noting that defendants’ decision only to challenge strict liability and
medical monitoring claims may indicate the strength of the nuisance claim). See also Neslin,
supra note 312, at 9 (noting that the Berish court, while declining to dismiss the strict
liability claim, considered it unlikely to succeed but thought assessment on summary
judgment motion post-discovery more appropriate).
336.
See Neslin, supra note 331, at 7 (discussing these types of claims).
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settled.337 Whether these difficulties in proving defendants’ responsibility
for alleged pollution are caused by a substantive lack of merit or simply the
evidentiary hurdles of proving causation, the results indicate that litigation
is unlikely to be a promising source of protection for landowners seeking
redress from fracturing injuries.338 In the absence of a sea change in the
available causes of action or applicable evidentiary standards, individuals
will likely forced to “rely on public law solutions . . . that attempt to
minimize and prevent nuisances from oil and gas drilling and fracturing . . .
.”339
VI. Conclusion: Striking a Balance
If government regulatory systems are to be the primary check on
hydraulic fracturing practices and the danger of pollution, they must be
appropriately structured to provide substantive and adequate protection,
while remaining consistent with the principles of tribal self-determination
that guide Indian law and policy. As noted previously, one option might be
to revise BLM’s proposed regulations to provide a carve-out exemption for
wells within reservation boundaries, subjecting them only to more stringent
permitting and operating requirements if the tribe opts into the regulations
for public land or imposes its own.340 A similar result might be obtained if
the exemption of non-diesel hydraulic fracturing from the UIC program
were repealed, which would impose the same minimum standards for all
hydraulic fracturing wells. 341 Such an approach would entail significant
trade-offs, as it would mean the imposition of certain extra-tribal regulatory
standards on the tribal government—a move that tribes often justifiably
resist342—while affording tribal control over enforcement that may be more
337.
See Neslin, supra note 331, at 4 (noting that two water contamination cases were
dismissed on defendants’ motion, two on plaintiffs’, and one by a state agency, while four
others settled).
338.
Compare King et al., supra note 26, at 349–50 (arguing that plaintiff-landowners
lack an understanding of fracking technique and embellish the effects of fracking on their
property, when the results they argue are “physically impossible”) with Neslin, supra note
331, at 15 (noting that while causation difficulties appear to have discouraged new litigation,
“the number of tort cases could increase if scientific studies provide reliable evidence
linking hydraulic fracturing to ground water contamination or health impacts”).
339.
Wiseman, supra note 18, at 11.
340.
See supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing this approach to the
proposed regulations). Taken to its logical conclusion, this principle of tribal control might
also counsel the removal of BLM or BIA from the permitting process entirely, or at least to
the greatest extent administratively feasible. See Fredericks & Aseff, supra note 146, at 120–
24 (discussing the considerable costs and burdens associated with federal permitting, and the
uncertain jurisdiction of the agencies in any case).
341.
See supra notes 293–98 and accompanying text (discussing the aims of the UIC
program and the 2005 amendment).
342.
See Comment Letter from Tex Hall, Chairman, Three Affiliated Tribes, to
Environmental Protection Agency, at 1–2 (Aug. 23, 2012), available at

FRACTURED FOCUS

355

difficult to challenge than tribal regulation under inherent powers. 343 In
terms of practical politics, however, this appears unlikely to occur;
revocation of the non-diesel fracking exception was proposed during the
112th Congress and left to die in committee.344
Even these solutions would still leave unresolved the problem of
differential regulatory standards in tribal and state jurisdictions, and the
possibility for undesirable cross-border effects. A tribe like the Turtle
Mountain Band that would elect stronger environmental protections in lieu
of economic development has no real means to take preventative action
against an operator outside its jurisdiction, and would be forced to rely on
remedial action after the fact in case of a spill or leak.345 In some instances,
however, Congress has given tribes the authority to be treated as states
under federal environmental statutes for the purposes of administering those
programs, as well as setting more stringent regulations than the minimum
federal statutory requirements.346 In some cases, this has meant that tribes
can, in effect, project their regulations outside their reservation boundaries
in order to give effect to them within the ordinary scope of tribal
jurisdiction. 347 A similar approach could be taken in the context of
fracturing, whereby federal law would give effect to tribal permitting and
operation regulations that are more stringent than a state’s regulations if the
wells are sufficiently close to a reservation that a spill or leak would cause
environmental degradation or a danger to public health within the
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-1013-2701 (arguing
that the proposed UIC guidance should only be applied to tribes if current operations are
proved to be dangerous, and rejecting the notion that short-term fracking operations are
properly within the scope of Class II well regulation).
343.
See Cross, supra note 235, at 554 (noting that use of inherent authority is “more
legally uncertain” than using delegated federal authority).
344.
See H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); Bill Summary & Status, 112th
Congress
(2011–2012),
H.R.
1084,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.01084: (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (stating
that the last major action was reference to the House Subcommittee on Environment and the
Economy on March 21, 2011).
345.
See COHEN, supra note 64, § 4.01[2][f], at 222 (noting that “[t]ribes have
traditionally had power over both their members and their territory,” and thus have power
over non-Indians only once they have entered reservation land) (internal quotations omitted).
Cf. id. § 7.02[1][c], at 603 (noting that tribal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction extends
outside Indian country only when exercise of off-reservation treaty rights, or other matters
involving internal concerns of tribal members or issues of core sovereignty, are under
consideration).
346.
See id. § 10.03[2][a], at 793–97 (discussing Congress’ amendment of the Clean
Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and Clean Air Act to authorize tribal treatment as
states, and subsequent court interpretations thereof).
347.
See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 418–19 (10th Cir. 1996)
(upholding EPA’s enforcement, via an NPDES permit, of Isleta Pueblo’s elevated water
quality standards for the Rio Grande against the City of Albuquerque’s water treatment plant
five miles upriver).
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boundaries of the reservation. To avoid creating widespread jurisdictional
uncertainty, tribal authority probably must be circumscribed by a bright
line, limited to wells within a specified distance from a reservation
boundary or water source used on the reservation. While such an approach
would provide effective means to enforce the strongest tribal environmental
protections, it raises a host of practical difficulties, not the least of which is
political infeasibility and the likelihood of extensive litigation.
At the same time, negative environmental results of lower standards
could work in both directions, with more relaxed state policies working to
the detriment of a reservation like Turtle Mountain, where fracturing is
entirely prohibited; while on a reservation like Fort Berthold, less stringent
tribal/federal regulations could work to the detriment of the state. Because
the tribes and states have a shared area of regulatory concern—orderly
administration of energy development and environmental protection in their
border regions—each side stands to gain from a cooperative relationship
with the other that would provide adequate mutual respect for the
regulations of each government.348 Under such an arrangement, states and
tribes might be able to negotiate terms that would maximize the ability of
the less stringent regulator to foster energy production while assuring the
more stringent regulator of the full benefits of its environmental
protections. This could, for example, take the form of a buffer zone along a
jurisdictional border—where development would be moderated by agreedupon conditions, with the aim of insulating the more restrictive jurisdiction
from air and water pollution on the other side—or a voluntary consensus on
permitting and operation requirements for fracturing wells. Given that tribes
have already taken steps in this direction, such as Fort Berthold’s agreement
resolving taxation schemes with the state, a cooperative agreement on
development and environmental protection should not be considered
farfetched.349
Wherever the current debate over hydraulic fracturing regulation
ultimately leads, it should be clear from the preceding review that a
homogenous approach, imposed from the top down by a federal authority,
will prove unsatisfactory. While it may provide substantive protections for
some stakeholders, it is largely unable to take into account specific tribes’
judgments and goals regarding development of their energy resources. The
fact that each tribe faces its own particular economic and environmental
348.
See Cross, supra note 235, at 555–56 (noting that Fort Berthold’s new status as a
leading energy producer means that “the tribe will have to work with the state to ensure the
efficient and responsible development of their shared energy resources” in a way that avoids
serious legal/political dispute); Harvard Project, supra note 232, at 72–77 (describing how
states and tribes have begun entering into a variety of negotiated intergovernmental
arrangements to solve complicated policy problems, which have allowed economic growth
for states and expanded services for tribes).
349.
See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text (discussing the tax agreement).
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circumstances necessarily means that the appropriate regulations for each
will be different. The proper role of the federal government is to enable
tribes to make informed judgments for themselves, whether that means
providing resources for tribes to develop local regulatory regimes, granting
tribes proactive regulatory authority, or brokering voluntary agreements
between tribes and states. While prudent environmental management calls
for oversight and substantive regulation of fracturing, and while the
proposed federal rules fill a void in public lands regulation on the subject,
tribal self-determination requires federal restraint, not federal intervention.
Each tribe must be left to decide for itself what place, if any, hydraulic
fracturing will have in its development of energy resources.

